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Abstract
This study analyzes the effect of retirement on cognitive function. According to the
human capital theory, we can hypothesize that workers invest in their cognitive ability
more than retirees because cognitive investment increases a worker’s wage. As a result,
it is possible that the cognitive ability decreases after retirement, a hypothesis analyzed
in this study. In health economics, this hypothesis has been examined especially after
2000. First, we show that an analysis method used in some related studies is not valid
for estimating this effect. Furthermore, we analyze this effect by using our method.
Our estimates indicate that the workers’ mathematical scores decrease after retirement
in a wide range of analyzed countries and heterogeneous groups. However, retirement
has a weak effect on cognitive ability. Additionally, we investigate the heterogeneity of
this effect. For example, we find that the elderly with higher body mass indexs and fat
intake experience a negative effect of retirement on cognitive function.
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1 Introduction
Many developed countries have been faced with the issue of an aging population. By 2015,
there were almost 900 million individuals aged 60 years and over living worldwide. Rising
life expectancy is contributing to rapid increases in these numbers and is associated with
increased prevalence of chronic diseases such as dementia. According to the World Alzheimer
Report 2015 1 , the global costs of dementia have increased from USD 604 billion in 2010 to
USD 818 billion in 2015, that is, an increase of 35.4 percent. Recently, some studies have
investigated the relation between retirement and cognitive function. For example, according
to Rohwedder and Willis (2010), there is a negative effect of retirement on cognitive function.
The question is what is the mechanism behind this phenomenon. As Rohwedder and Willis
(2010) point out, one of the hypotheses is explained by the human capital theory in economics.
Ben-Porath (1967) introduced the concept of a human capital production function. This
function relates inputs such as current stock of human capital and the investment such as
schooling or on-the-job training to the skill output. On the possibility that retirement causes
cognitive decline, one hypothesis is that workers engage in more cognitive investment behavior
than retirees because cognitive investment increases a worker’s wage.
Health problems after retirement have become one important public policy relevant top-
ics. As such, retirement-related policies, such as a reform of the pension system, have become
important for developed countries to sustain their social security systems. Numerous devel-
oped countries have been facing similar problems of a decreasing birthrate and an aging
population. As population ages, the cost of social security and welfare increases, eroding the
country’s budget. As such, numerous developed countries have reformed the pension system
to reduce the cost of social security and social welfare. Countries such as the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Korea have already decided to increase the pension eligibility age
in the subsequent decades, while Japan has already done so. Such pension reforms in devel-
oped countries are mostly expected to delay retirement. As Gruber and Wise (1998) discuss,
the relationship between the social security system and retirement in developed countries has
attracted a fair amount of attention in economics. When policy makers evaluate the effects
of these reforms, health is a key factor. Since an active work life is beneficial for the health of
the elderly, it would lead to a reduction of medical expenses, whereas their medical expenses
would increases otherwise.
Along the growing interest on the effect of the policies that delay the retirement of the
elderly, a number of studies have investigated the relation between retirement and health over
the past two decades. 2 Since the controversy continues with respect to the estimated results
1 See the website at https://www.alz.co.uk/research/world-report-2015 for further details.
2 Using various health indexes, numerous researchers have examined this relationship. Kerkhofs and
Lindeboom (1997) is one of the first studies that suggests endogenous decisions between retirement and
health, and explains the effect of retirement on health. They find that the Hopkins Symptom Checklist, a
health index, can be improved after early retirement in the Netherlands by applying fixed effect methods.
Lindeboom et al. (2002) extend Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1997)’s study to other indices, such as the Mini
Mental State Examination test on cognitive ability, the CES-D test of depressing feelings, and applying
fixed effect methods to Dutch data, which yields different results from those of Kerkhofs and Lindeboom
(1997). Charles (2004) is also one of the first to analyze the causal effect of retirement on health in economic
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of various health indexes, the discussion about the effects of retirement on cognitive function
is no exception. For example, Adam et al. (2006) confirm the positive effect of occupational
activities on the cognitive function of the elderly in Europe. On the other hand, Rohwedder
and Willis (2010) discuss this hypothesis to explain why retirement decreases cognitive func-
tion, and show the negative relationship between these using elementary regression analysis.
However, they do not control for basic elements such as age and education. Bingley and
Martinello (2013) reexamine the estimated model of Rohwedder and Willis (2010), adding
years of education and gender variables, and concluding that their estimated negative effect
is weaker than the results of Rohwedder and Willis (2010). This implies that the results
are sensitive to the controlled characteristics included in the model of Rohwedder and Willis
(2010). Furthermore, Coe and Zamarro (2011) find no clear relationship between retirement
and cognitive function in Europe. Coe et al. (2012) also find no clear general relationship
between them, 3 while, on the other hand, Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) find a negative re-
lationship between the two in Europe. Bonsang et al. (2012) also find a negative relationship
between the two, although they control only for age factors. Depending on specifications,
the negative relationship might change. As such, Kajitani et al. (2014) suggest the existence
of cognitive deterioration heterogeneity, depending on the characteristics of the occupation.
Kajitani et al. (2016a) also suggest that the duration of retirement has a negative effect on
cognitive function. 4
Consequently, the goal of this study is to examine the controversial hypothesis that there
exists a causal effect of retirement on cognitive function. To do so, we examine two items.
First, we examine the validity of cross-sectional estimation and the influence of the set of
analyzed countries on the effect of retirement on cognitive function. Second, we reexamine
this effect in the U.S. and other countries. We also investigate the source of heterogeneity
of the effect by using a simple economic model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first analysis to interpret the effect of retirement on cognitive ability by using an economic
model with endogenous retirement. Based on this discussion, we empirically evaluate the
heterogeneity of individual characteristics and of the time spent on leisure activities. These
points are either not covered or mentioned as a scope for further research in literature. Our
estimates indicate that workers mathematical scores decrease after retirement in a wide range
of analyzed countries and heterogeneous groups. This finding is related to the studies sug-
gesting that mathematical scores are strongly related to the worker’s wage. (Rose and Betts,
2004; Altonji, Blom, and Meghir, 2012; Rendall et al., 2014) Additionally, we analyze the
effect of body mass index (BMI) and fat intake on the heterogeneity of the effect of retire-
ment on cognitive function, a relationship discussed in medical literature. The remainder of
literature, focusing on subjective wellbeing and using instrumental variables (IV). Additionally, there are
numerous studies that analyze the effect of retirement on various health indexes. For example, Bound and
Waidmann (2007), Coe and Lindeboom (2008), Dave et al. (2008), Neuman (2008), Johnston and Lee (2009),
Latif (2011), Coe and Zamarro (2011), Kajitani (2011), Behncke (2012), Bonsang et al. (2012), Mazzonna
and Peracchi (2012), Hernaes et al. (2013), Bingley and Martinello (2013), Hashimoto (2013), Insler (2014),
Kajitani et al. (2014), Hashimoto (2015), and Kajitani et al. (2016a) are among the representative studies.
3 They find a positive relationship between retirement duration and cognitive function only for blue-collar
workers.
4Kajitani et al. (2016b) suggest a non-linear effect of working hours on cognitive function.
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this paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the dataset used; section 3 discusses
the heterogeneity of the effect of retirement on cognitive function; section 4 examines the
validity of the cross-sectional cross-country analysis; section 5 performs dynamic analysis and
discusses our main results; and section 6 concludes this paper and discusses the future scope
for research.
2 Data
This paper uses the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)5 and other similar datasets,
such as the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS), the English Lon-
gitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE), and the Japanese Study of Ageing and Retirement (JSTAR). They are panel sur-
veys of individuals aged 50 or over. Moreover, the family datasets are constructed so that
the questions in the HRS family studies are as similar as possible to the original questions
in the HRS. They include a rich variety of variables to capture living aspects in terms of
economic status, health status, family background, as well as social and work status.
We use the cognitive function score in the HRS and other related datasets. In the HRS, we
use the test scores of immediate word recall (first half of word recall test), delayed word recall
(second half of word recall test)6, serial7’s, backwards counting and word recall summary score
(immediate word recall + delayed word recall). Word recall summary score is between 0 and
20. The immediate word recall and delayed word recall tests ask the respondent to recall as
many words as possible from a list of 10 words. The score of Immediate Word Recall and
Delayed Word Recall is the number of words from 10-word list that were recalled correctly.
The serial7’s test asks the respondent to subtract 7 from the prior number beginning with
100 for 5 trials. The score of the serial7’s test is between 0 and 5. The backwards counting
test asks the respondent to count backwards for 10 continuous numbers from 20. The original
score of this test is 2 if successful on the first try, 1 if successful on the second, and 0 if not
successful on either try. However, we make the indicator which is equal to one when the
respondent is successful on the first try. We use only this indicator suggesting whether the
respondent succeed on the first try.7 In section 3, we use only word recall summary score,
while sections 4 and 5, we use all types of scores.
We summarize the cognitive function scores in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows the descrip-
tive statistics of the age group from 60 to 69 in all countries, and the descriptive statistics for
the U.S. are shown in Table 2. According to Table 1, cognition scores are not the same level
in all countries.8 All scores in China and European countries are comparatively low compared
to the U.S., the U.K., Korea, and Japan. In Table 2, we can observe certain characteristics of
5See the website (http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu) for details
6There are two rounds in the Word Recall tests. In the first round (immediate word recall), there is a test
to recall the number of words as much as possible. In the second round (delayed word recall), a respondent
is asked to recall the same words after a given period of time.
7We make the indicator suggesting whether the respondent succeed on the first try because we cannot
interpret the estimated coefficient of the original score.
8In each test, the maximum test score in KLoSA is different from that of other studies.
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cognitive function: females have higher score than males in the word recall summary score,
and males have higher score than females in serial’7. Highly educated (Univ. Graduate)
individuals have higher score than individuals with lower levels of education in all cognitive
scores.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Cognition Scores (Age 60 -69) around 2010
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
HRS
Word Recall Sum. Score 5057 10.33 3.23 0 20
Immediate Word Recall 5057 5.64 1.56 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 5057 4.68 1.89 0 10
Serial 7’s 5057 3.53 1.65 0 5
ELSA∗1
Word Recall Sum. Score 3593 11.17 3.32 0 20
Immediate Word Recall 3592 6.17 1.67 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 3593 5.01 1.93 0 10
SHARE∗2
Word Recall Sum. Score 18998 9.31 3.40 0 20
Immediate Word Recall 19025 5.33 1.68 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 19019 3.97 2.03 0 10
Serial 7’s 18576 3.76 1.74 0 5
JSTAR
Word Recall Sum. Score 1463 10.10 3.00 0 20
Immediate Word Recall 1501 5.27 1.49 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 1471 4.80 1.85 0 10
Serial 7’s 1508 4.10 1.20 0 5
CHARLS
Word Recall Sum. Score 3838 6.89 3.16 0 18
Immediate Word Recall 3890 3.91 1.60 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 3856 2.95 1.87 0 10
Serial 7’s 3880 3.11 1.88 0 5
KLoSA
Word Recall Sum. Score∗3 2253 4.74 1.31 0 6
Immediate Word Recall∗3 2253 2.68 0.67 0 3
Delayed Word Recall∗3 2253 2.06 0.96 0 3
Serial 7’s 2253 3.83 1.57 0 5
∗1: No Serial 7’s Score in ELSA.
∗2: Calculated using weight.
∗3: KLoSA’s Word Recall Scores are not comparable with other dataset.
We analyze the effect of retirement on cognitive function in two ways as explained in subse-
quent sections (sections 4 and 5). In the first analysis, we utilize cross-sectional cross-country
variations of pension eligibility age. Subsequently, we use the cross sectional datasets of the
HRS 2004 and 2010, ELSA 2004 and 2010, and SHARE 2004 and 2010, including CHARLS
2011 and JSTAR 2009. However, we cannot use the Korean Longitudinal Study of Ageing
(KLoSA) because the questions with respect to the test scores in the first analysis are not
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Table 2: Summary Statistics: The US (Age:60-69) at 2010
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Male Female
Word Recall Sum. Score 2038 9.70 3.14 0 20 3019 10.76 3.21 0 20
Immediate Word Recall 2038 5.37 1.56 0 10 3019 5.82 1.54 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 2038 4.32 1.82 0 10 3019 4.92 1.90 0 10
Serial 7’s 2038 3.76 1.55 0 5 3019 3.38 1.69 0 5
Not Univ. Graduate Univ. Graduate
Word Recall Sum. Score 3819 9.86 3.14 0 20 1236 11.81 3.05 0 20
Immediate Word Recall 3819 5.42 1.53 0 10 1236 6.33 1.45 0 10
Delayed Word Recall 3819 4.43 1.84 0 10 1236 5.45 1.82 0 10
Serial 7’s 3819 3.27 1.70 0 5 1236 4.33 1.12 0 5
White Blue
Word Recall Sum. Score 2889 11.04 3.13 0 20 1027 9.36 3.05 1 19
Immediate Word Recall 2889 5.95 1.50 0 10 1027 5.17 1.50 1 10
Delayed Word Recall 2889 5.08 1.85 0 10 1027 4.17 1.76 0 10
Serial 7’s 2889 3.80 1.51 0 5 1027 3.25 1.69 0 5
comparable with other datasets. We use JSTAR 2009 because the survey year is nearest to
the other studies of 2010 and all respondents are the questions of the word recall summary
score, while in JSTAR 2011 these questions are asked to only people above 65. In the second
analysis, we perform a dynamic analysis of certain countries. We utilize both the pension
eligibility age and the long-term variation of retirement behavior, and we choose the analyzed
countries based on the availability of information on pension eligibility age. We mainly use
the harmonized datasets. 9 However, when the variables are not available in the harmonized
datasets, we use the variables of the original datasets. In Table 3, we explain which dataset
we use in each section of this paper.
In this paper, we use the pensionable age for IV, and perform the cross-sectional cross-
country analysis in section 4, using the pensionable age for all countries we analyze. Ro-
hwedder and Willis (2010) and Bingley and Martinello (2013) also perform a cross-sectional
cross-country analysis and use the pensionable age based on Pensions at a Glance (OECD)
and Social Security Programs throughout the World: Europe, 2004. However, the pension-
able ages in some countries are partly incorrect. We correct these and explain this point in
the Appendix (A.1). In section 5, we use only the pensionable ages confirmed to be correct.
9 The Gateway to Global Aging Data (http://gateway.usc.edu) provides harmonized versions of data from
international aging and retirement studies (e.g., HRS, ELSA, SHARE, KLoSA, CHARLS). All variables of
each dataset aim to have the same items and follow the same naming conventions. As such, the harmonized
datasets enable researchers to conduct cross-national comparative studies. The program code to generate the
harmonized datasets from the original datasets is provided by the Center for Global Ageing Research, USC
Davis School of Gerontology and the Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR). Some variables, such
as measures of assets and income, are imputed by this code.
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Table 3: The datasets which we use in each section
Wave Year
Section 4 (Cross Sectional Analysis)
The HRS 7,10 2004,2010
The SHARE 1,4 2004,2010
The ELSA 2,5 2004,2010
The JSTAR 2 2009
The CHARLS 1 2011
Section 5 (Dynamic Analysis)
The HRS 3-10 1996-2010
The SHARE∗1 1-5 2004-2012
The ELSA 1-6 2002-2014
The JSTAR 1-4 2007-2013
The KLoSA 1-4 2006-2012
∗1: We analyze only Denmark, France and Germany.
3 Retirement and Cognitive Function Decline
3.1 Discussion
One of our targets is to analyze the heterogeneity of retirement on cognitive function
effect. As such, we discuss in this section which characteristics correlate the difference in the
cognitive scores between retirees and non-retirees, establishing that there are factors except
basic individual characteristics, such as gender, job characteristics, etc., which correlate this
difference.
First, we show the average scores of the serial 7’s test and the word recall summary in
Japan, the U.S., South Korea, China, Germany and France. In Figures 1 and 2, we show
the difference in the average cognitive scores between retired and non-retired individuals in
different countries. Generally, the difference in cognitive scores between retired and non-
retired individuals is extremely small in all analyzed countries. This difference is based on
two retirement definitions, as per related literature, that is, “self-reported retire” and “not
work for pay”. 10 “Not work for pay” is self-explanatory, meaning that a respondent is not
working for wages or other type of payment. “Self-reported retire” means that a respondent
reports his status to be retired: for this definition, we use the “r@lbrf” variable in each har-
monized data (e.g., Harmonized SHARE, Harmonized ELSA), which is constructed based on
the RAND HRS data. In the HRS, “r@lbrf” takes seven values, and we define a respondent
as “self-reported retire” if “r@lbrf” indicates “partly retired,” “retired,” “disabled” or “not
in labor force.” In other words, the difference between “not work for pay” and “self-reported
retire” is whether unemployed respondents are included or excludes. 11 Numerous related
10 For example, the respondent retire if the respondent is “not work for pay” in Rohwedder and Willis
(2010). In Bonsang et al. (2012), a respondent is ““Retired” if he/she reports not working” (self-reported
status).
11 See the codebook of the Rand HRS data if you want to know the detail about the variable “r@lbrf”
which we use. http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/modules/meta/rand/randhrsm/randhrsM.pdf. They explain
how they construct the variable “r@lbrf” in p.1033. We use the variable “r@lbrf” in all Harmonized Data
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studies (e.g. Rohwedder and Willis (2010), Coe and Zamarro (2011), Bonsang et al. (2012),
Bingley and Martinello (2013)) use two similar definitions of retirement.
The two different definitions of retirement are used in Figures 1 and 2, where we can
observe the difference in the relationship of cognitive scores between retired and non-retired
individuals in certain countries. However, the influence of the retirement definition used is
weak. The relationship of cognitive scores between retired and non-retired individuals is
similar across countries for both definitions. However, the relationship of cognitive scores
between retirees and non-retirees is heterogeneous between different countries. For example,
with respect to the serial 7s score in the U.S., the score for those retired is lower than for those
not retired. On the other hand, in China, the retired have higher scores than not retired
individuals. The cognitive function scores between retired and not retired people have a
heterogeneous relationship, which depends on the analyzed countries. This relationship does
not seem to change depending on the types of cognitive score. Additionally, in the word recall
summary score, the score of retired individuals is lower than that of not retired ones in the
U.S. On the other hand, in China, the opposite is true. Japan has the similar characteristics
with China in serial 7’s score. Since each country has different demographics, it is possible
that this difference correlates the difference in the relationship of overall average cognitive
scores between retirees and non-retirees.
Sets.
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Figure 1: The Serial 7’s Score and The Word Recall Summary Score By Country (All waves)
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Figure 2: The Serial 7’s Score and The Word Recall Summary Score By Country (All waves)
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Subsequently, Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 compare the cognitive levels of the U.S. and China
for each characteristic. In related studies, heterogeneity such as gender differences and job
types are important for explaining the retirement on cognitive function effect. In fact, Coe
et al. (2012) estimate the effect of retirement on cognitive function depending on job types
(white-collar and blue-collar). In Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6, when we separate respondents into
two job categories, we use the information based on “occupation code for job with longest
reported tenure” in the U.S. With respect to China, we cannot separate the job category into
white-collar and blue-collar in the same way because the information on the job category of
retirees is not available. As a result, we do not use the cognitive scores based on job types
in China. As we observe in the above-mentioned figures, there are some characteristics for
finding the heterogeneity between the U.S. and China in Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6. However,
the difference in cognitive scores between retirees and non-retirees in these figures is not the
effect of retirement on cognitive function since the former is endogenous. However, we can
observe that unobserved heterogeneity influences the difference in cognitive score between
retirees and non-retirees among different countries.
• In each country, the differences in characteristics, such as gender, educational, and
asset level differences, explain the difference in cognitive function between retirees and
non-retirees. In fact, the differences between their scores are heterogeneous, depending
on gender, educational, and asset level differences. Moreover, the influence of retirement
definition on the difference in the cognitive scores between retirees and non-retirees is
weak.
• It is possible that there exist characteristics, except gender, educational, and asset level
differences to cause the difference in the scores between retirees and non-retirees. As
such, endogeneity of retirement causes a difference in cognitive scores between retirees
and non-retirees. However, it is possible that these factors strongly correlate with the
country of residence. In fact, in China, the cognitive function scores of retirees are
larger than those of non-retirees for all characteristics, while the relationship is inverse
in the U.S. for all characteristics. These relationships are similar for both scores of
serial 7s and word recall summary score. The unobserved factors, except gender and
educational differences, are important because it is possible these factors cause the
inverse relationship between the scores of retirees and non-retirees.
As discussed in this section, factors, except gender, educational, and asset level differences,
are important for explaining the difference in cognitive function scores between retirees and
non-retirees. In other words, when we consider the effect of retirement on cognitive function,
we have to consider the influence of the unobserved heterogeneity on the difference in cognitive
function scores. In the next section, through a critical review of related literature, we consider
this point further.
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Figure 3: The Serial 7’s Score in The U.S. and China (All waves) By Education Level, Gender,
Occupational Type and Wealth Level: Univ = University, LTU = Lower Than University
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Figure 4: The Serial 7’s Score in The U.S. and China (All waves) By Education Level, Gender,
Occupational Type and Wealth Level: Univ = University, LTU = Lower Than University
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Figure 5: The Word Recall Summary Score in The U.S. and China (All waves) By Education Level,
Gender, Occupational Type and Wealth Level
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Figure 6: The Word Recall Summary Score in The U.S. and China (All waves) By Education Level,
Gender, Occupational Type and Wealth Level
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4 Validation Analysis on Cross-Sectional Cross-Country
Analysis
In the previous section, we discussed the heterogeneity of the difference in cognitive scores
between retirees and non-retirees among different countries. To further consider this point,
determine the validity of cross-sectional analysis in previous literature through a critical
review. As robustness is weak when using the estimation strategy based on cross-sectional
analysis, we find that the estimated results are sensitive with respect to heterogeneity of the
set of analyzed countries. We consider that the effect of only a part of the analyzed countries
influences the final effect of retirement on cognitive function.
4.1 Identification Strategy of Cross-Sectional Cross-Country Anal-
ysis
In this section, we investigate the robustness of the estimation strategy using cross-country
variations of pension eligibility age. Since the goal of this research is that we estimate the
effect of retirement on cognitive function, the target of our identification strategy is to exclude
the endogeneity bias of the retirement variable. Our analysis is carried out in two stages:
first, we perform a cross-sectional cross-country analysis; and, second, a dynamic analysis
using panel structure is carried out. In the first stage, the identification strategy is to use the
variation of pension eligibility ages among different countries in a specific year, which varies
by country. We can use this exogenous variation for controlling for retirement endogeneity
by simultaneously analyzing different countries with different pension eligibility ages
Rohwedder and Willis (2010) analyze the effect of retirement on cognitive function Simi-
larly, which we reexamine along with other related studies (Coe and Zamarro (2011), Bingley
and Martinello (2013)) in this paper. When analyzing the effect of retirement on cognitive
function, the problem of the cross-country cross-sectional analysis is that the results are not
robust when we change the specifications or the set of analyzed countries. Considering the
observed heterogeneity or changing the set of analyzed countries provides heterogeneous re-
sults. We consider that the effect of only a limited set of the analyzed countries influences
the final effect of retirement on cognitive function by using this strategy. Rohwedder and
Willis (2010) use pension eligibility ages based on external data sources. 12 Moreover, we
investigate again whether the pension eligibility ages in the analyzed countries are correct
and find that they are partly incorrect. Therefore we use a modified version of the pen-
sion eligibility ages in Rohwedder and Willis (2010). In the Appendix (A.1), we explain the
pension eligibility ages used in this section.
According to our analysis, the effect of retirement on cognitive function is heterogeneous in
different country sets. Therefore, it is important to analyze this effect in each country because
it is possible that the unobserved heterogeneity cannot be controlled for using cross-sectional
cross-country analysis. To omit individual unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate the effect
12 They use the Pensions at a Glance (OECD) and Social Security Programs throughout the World: Europe,
2004.
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of retirement on cognitive function by using the dynamic variation of individual retirement
behavior in the second stage analysis.
4.2 Analysis Framework
Rohwedder and Willis (2010) estimate the following model. They use the HRS, the
SHARE, and the ELSA for 2004, restricting the analyzed sample between ages of 60 and
64. Moreover, Rohwedder and Willis (2010) do not control for any variable. notworki is an
indicator which is equal to one when a respondent is in the not work for pay category in the
survey year, cognition scorei is the word recall summary score (minimum 0, maximum 20),
and agei is the respondent’s age.
cognition scorei = β0 + β1notworki + 1i (1)
notworki = α0 + α11{agei ≥ Aebi }+ α21{agei ≥ Afbi }+ 2i
Aebi : the early retirement benefit eligibility age
Afbi : the full retirement benefit eligibility age
Bingley and Martinello (2013) estimate the same model as in (1), additionally including
the years of schooling variable. However, we control for other control variables except the
educational level. As discussed in subsequent sections, according to medical literature, it is
possible that other individual characteristics except the educational level influence cognitive
function, which we implement in our analysis. However, we also check for the sensitivity
of the effect of retirement on cognitive function in the various set of control variables. We
estimate the following model considering observed respondent heterogeneity.
cognition scorei = β0 + β1notworki + γ
′xi + 1i (2)
notworki = α0 + α11{agei ≥ Aebi }+ α21{agei ≥ Afbi }+ η′xi + 2i
Aebi : the early retirement benefit eligibility age
Afbi : the full retirement benefit eligibility age
In model (1), the individual characteristics, xi, of model (2) are unobserved. These produce
the difference of cognitive function and also can correlate with the variable . They can also
modify the final effect of retirement on health conclusion. Rohwedder and Willis (2010) and
Bingley and Martinello (2013) do not use any estimation weights for cross-country analysis in
their estimations and do not adjust the estimation according to population size, we produce
an estimation weight based on the source of UN data: A World of Information, 13. and
explain the methodology of calculating an estimation weight in the Appendix (A.3).
With respect to the control variables included in the estimation model, it is rather difficult
to assess which variables need to be included. For example, public health literature studies the
13See the website http://data.un.org/Default.aspx for more detail.
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determinants of cognitive function, certain studies discuss the relationship between behavioral
factors (physical activity, lifestyle habits and leisure time activity) and cognitive function (Dik
et al. (2003), Scarmeas and Stern (2003), Wilson et al. (2003), Nyberg et al. (2012), Raji
et al. (2016), Satizabal et al. (2016)). As such, McEwen and Sapolsky (1995) and Sindi et al.
(2016) indicate the relationship between stress and cognitive function. Moreover, Nyberg
et al. (2000) suggest that gender differences influence cognitive function. Satizabal et al.
(2016) find that the incidence of dementia has declined over the last three decades, but
cannot find a factor that explains this phenomenon. There are also numerous studies that
discuss the relationship between social factors and cognitive function. In our study, we include
demographic factors, such as gender, family structure, economic variables, and the country of
residence, in the estimation model to control for fundamental social determinants of human
behavior. In section 5, we also discuss how social factors influence cognitive function using a
simple economic model.
In summary, the analysis of this section has the following conclusions.
• The effect of control variables for individual heterogeneity cannot be ignored. However,
in this framework (cross-country cross-sectional analysis), the magnitude of the effect
of retirement on cognitive function is similar to the magnitude estimated in some of
related literature (Rohwedder and Willis (2010), Bingley and Martinello (2013)), even
though we include control variables for individual heterogeneity.
• We also examine the effect of changing the set of the analyzed sample (e.g., changing
the set of analyzed countries), which is significant. This suggests that the effects of
retirement on cognitive function are also heterogeneous among different groups even if
the analyzed groups have similar ages.
• The IV we correct largely influence the final results when we compare them to the
results estimated by the instrumental variable which Rohwedder and Willis (2010) and
Bingley and Martinello (2013) use. As such the correcting effect of the IV is not weak.
Finally, the figure of Rohwedder and Willis (2010) (Figure 6) using the 2010 dataset has
certain drawbacks. 14 According to Figure 7, there is no intuitive relationship, discussed in
Rohwedder and Willis (2010), between average cognitive score and percent eligible for early
public pension benefits. In Rohwedder and Willis (2010), they show the negative relationship
between average cognitive score and Percent eligible for early public pension benefits. This
indicates that the intuitive relationship of Rohwedder and Willis (2010) is also not robust.
4.3 Results
First, we restrict the sample to those aged 60 to 64, following Rohwedder and Willis (2010)
and Bingley and Martinello (2013). Subsequently, we examine the effect of including the other
control variables and changing the IV (Table 4). The IV1 columns represents the analysis
14See Figure 6 in Rohwedder and Willis (2010), pp.134-135.
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Figure 7: Similar Analysis in Figure 6 by Rohwedder and Willis (2010) (the dataset at 2010)
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Figure 8: Similar Analysis in Figure 6 by Rohwedder and Willis (2010) (the dataset at 2010)
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results when we use the same IV as Rohwedder and Willis (2010) and Bingley and Martinello
(2013). The IV2 columns show the analysis results when we use our IV, which are confirmed
to be correct. We estimate the results using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method when
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test is not rejected in the specification using IV. When
the DWH test is rejected, we support the result of the specification using IV. Column (1)
in Table 4 presents the results of the specification in Rohwedder and Willis (2010); column
(3) shows the results of the specification in Bingley and Martinello (2013); 15 and column
(2) are the results of only changing the variable of university enrollment indicator in Bingley
and Martinello (2013). We also verify the effect of the difference in the education level
definition on the estimated coefficients in the columns (2) and (3). Form columns (4)-(7),
we use basic individual characteristics variables, which Rohwedder and Willis (2010) and
Bingley and Martinello (2013) do not include. As such, column (4) only controls for the age
effect, column (5) adds country dummies into specification (2) and columns (6) and (7) add
the other individual characteristics control variables into specification (5). The properties of
Table 4 can be summarized as follows.
• The Difference in the IV: changing the IV1 and IV2 gradually influences the value
of the coefficients when we add control variables for individual characteristics. The
effect becomes gradually larger as the control variables for individual heterogeneity
are included when we compare the specifications between IV1 and IV2. Specification
(1), which is the same as in Rohwedder and Willis (2010), produces a small difference
in the effect of retirement on cognitive function between IV1 and IV2. However, for
specifications (6) and (7), the difference in the effect of retirement on cognitive function
(between IV1 and IV2) is very large. Consequently,the estimated effect of retirement
on cognitive function is influenced by the included control variables.
• The Difference in the Control Variables: when we include country dummies, the change
in the magnitude of the coefficients is very large. When comparing the specifications (2)
and (5), the magnitude of the coefficients of (2) is significantly larger compared to (5).
Finally, the direction of the coefficient is negative in specification (6), while the absolute
value of the coefficient is very small (the OLS result in specification (7): -0.455 (OLS)).
The value of specification (2) coefficient of is -6.538 (IV2). As a result, the omitted
variable bias is significant in specification (2). The results of Table 4 suggest that the
country’s effect of retirement on cognitive function heterogeneity is significant and not
weak as per Table 4. In specification (7), the coefficients of Spain (OLS: -2.230) or Italy
(OLS: -1.243) are negative, while the coefficient of the U.S. (OLS: 2.082) is positive.
• The Influence of Estimation Weight: we estimate the effect of retirement on cogni-
tive function by using our estimation weight(calculation methodology is explained in
the Appendix (A.3)). According to Table 6, the effect of using estimation weights
is not insignificant. By using estimation weights, the influence of the U.S. and the
15 Bingley and Martinello (2013) impute the value of the years of schooling in the ELSA. However, we do
not impute this value and omit the sample of ELSA in column (3) in Table 4.
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U.K. increase because the population size is comparatively large in the set of analyzed
countries. When the influence of these two countries increases, the magnitude of the
retirement on cognitive function effect increases as well. The effect of retirement on
cognitive function is however negative.
Subsequently, we discuss the weighted estimation results in Table 6, and comment on
the difference in the definition of education level. We estimate the same specification as
Bingley and Martinello (2013)16 in column (3) of Table 6. The effect of omitting the ELSA
and the weighting estimation is significant. While Bingley and Martinello (2013) reports a
result of -3.014 in the specification “All” in their Table 3, we obtain coefficients of -5.011
(IV1) and -5.138 (IV2). Please note that we do not impute years of schooling variable of
ELSA. As a result, we omit the samples of the ELSA altogether. This point also suggests
that the change in the set of analyzed countries is significant as well. we use only the dummy
variable indicating people with education above college degree available in the harmonized
data set created with the code that Global Aging Data provides.17 We call the set of analyzed
countries in Tables 4 and 6the “original” set.
Table 8 shows the results of the same specification (7) in Table 6. However, we show the
results of the different cohorts. The columns “2004” present the estimated results using the
sample aged 60 to 64 in 2004. and the columns “2010” present the results for 2010. The
analyzed cohorts are different between the two columns, the analyzed countries are the same
in both the columns “2004” and “2010.” We analyze the same set of analyzed countries
except Greece in Tables 4 and 6. In 2010, Greece is omitted from the SHARE, making it
impossible to include it in the analysis. According to Table 8, the effect of the difference
in the cohorts is weak. The DWH tests in both columns “2004” and “2010” are rejected
(IV2). However, the OLS results are almost the same (-0.468 (2004) and -0.694 (2010)) after
controlling for the heterogeneity of the analyzed countries, and the coefficients of the other
control variables are also similar between the OLS result of “2004” and “2010.” The effect
of retirement on cognitive function is also strong in “2010.”
16See the specification “All” in Table 3 of Bingley and Martinello (2013).
17See the website at http://gateway.usc.edu.
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Table 9 reports the result when we change the set of analyzed countries. The age range is
from 60 to 69 because we can use the variation of pension eligibility age as much as possible
in numerous countries. The specification numbers of each column in Table 9 indicate the
same specification number of each column in Tables 4 and 6. All results are estimated by
using only the dataset of 2010. However, many countries have joined the sister survey of
the HRS since 2004. 18 We change the set of the analyzed countries in each result, and
separate it for 2010 into four regions based on linguistic areas. “Italic” shows the estimated
results including countries such as France, Spain Portugal, and Italy. Table 9 omits the
estimated results of the coefficients of the country dummies and other control variables in
each specification. “Slavic” includes only European countries: Estonia, Slovenia, Portland,
Hungary, and Czech Republic. “Germanic” includes European countries as well: the U.K.,
the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland. “New
SHARE and East Asia” includes Japan, China, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Portugal,
Slovenia, and Estonia. “Original without Greece” includes the countries in the “original”
set(the set of analyzed countries used by Rohwedder and Willis (2010)) without Greece. As
such, the degree of the heterogeneity of the estimated results is large as per Table 9. When
we analyze “original without Greece,” the coefficients are significantly negative (“original
without Greece”: -0.608 (OLS), “Germanic”: -0.333 (OLS), “Italic”: -0.362 (OLS)) while
the coefficients of “new SHARE and East Asia” or “Slavic” are significantly positive or
not significant (“New SHARE and East Asia”: 0.413 (OLS), “Slavic”: -0.138 (OLS)(not
significant)).
Finally, Table 10 shows the effect of changing the surveyed age-group and the definition
of retirement, with similar results to specification (7) in Table 6. The columns of “not
work” are the analysis for retirement defined as “not work for pay,” and the columns of “SR
retire” for retirement defined as “a respondent reports a retired status” (the same definition
as “self-reported retire” in the section 3 as in footnote 11). The “complete retire” is the
retirement defined as both “not work for pay” and “a respondent reports a retired status.”
According to Table 10, the effect of changing the age group and the retirement definition is
not significant.
In summary, this section emphasized the following findings:
• Unobserved heterogeneity largely influences the estimated result when we omit the
important control variables(Tables 4 and 6).
• The heterogeneity of the set of the analyzed countries largely influences the estimated
result. When we change the set of analyzed countries, we obtain a different conclusion.
As a result, we should pay attention to the heterogeneity of each country when we
analyze the effect of retirement on cognitive function(Table 9).
• The definition of retirement does not largely influence the estimated results. Occa-
sionally, the results derive different conclusions depending on the definition of retire-
ment(Table 10). 19
18The JSTAR is the data for 2009, the CHARLS is the data for 2011.
19Kajitani et al. (2013) also report that the sensitivity of the retirement definiton is weak.
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• Other factors, which are the difference in age groups or the difference in cohorts, are
not important(Table 8, 10).
According to our analysis, the country heterogeneity largely influences the estimated
results although the difference in cohorts or age groups is not important. When we use the
identification strategy in this section (cross-sectional cross-country analysis), we cannot omit
the unobserved heterogeneity that can correlate the other control variables and can be the
source of bias for the coefficient of the retirement variable. We consider we should analyze the
effect of retirement on cognitive function in only one country and omit unobserved individual
heterogeneity when we estimate this effect. In the subsequent section, we analyze countries
whose pension eligibility ages are confirmed to be correct. 20 We also analyze the influence
of heterogeneity of transition behavior (leisure activity) before and after retirement and the
influence of individual heterogeneity.
20In the Appendix (A.1), we discuss how to confirm pension eligibility age in each country.
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Table 9: The effect of the difference in the set of analyzed countries (Sample aged from 60
to 69)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2
Italic
1st Stage Result
IV-early 0.230∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.087 0.079
(0.053) (0.055) (0.052) (0.055) (0.057) (0.061) (0.063)
IV-normal 0.173∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.037∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.020)
2nd Stage Result
Not work for pay -0.854∗∗∗ -2.360∗∗∗ -0.653∗∗∗ -2.445∗∗∗ -0.446∗∗∗ -1.417∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗ 3.034∗∗ -0.774∗∗∗ -3.524∗∗∗ -0.559∗∗∗ -0.736 -0.362∗∗ -1.613
(0.140) (0.534) (0.143) (0.629) (0.133) (0.550) (0.145) (1.475) (0.140) (0.624) (0.148) (2.760) (0.159) (3.594)
Observations 4620 4620 4239 4239 4534 4534 4620 4620 4239 4239 4080 4080 3620 3620
R2 0.009 -0.020 0.063 0.023 0.186 0.174 0.022 -0.133 0.121 0.027 0.135 0.135 0.156 0.139
DWHchi2 9.859 10.931 3.337 6.108 24.089 0.003 0.100
DWHpval 0.002 0.001 0.068 0.013 0.000 0.953 0.752
Slavic
1st Stage Result
IV-early 0.053∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.049∗ -0.030 -0.020
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
IV-normal 0.265∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031)
2nd Stage Result
Not work for pay -0.584∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.624∗∗∗ -1.470∗ -0.315 -0.714 -0.414∗ 2.692∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗ -1.377∗ -0.426∗∗ 2.836 -0.138 2.917
(0.209) (0.708) (0.222) (0.889) (0.214) (0.848) (0.212) (1.278) (0.221) (0.826) (0.216) (2.312) (0.231) (2.513)
Observations 6789 6789 6664 6664 6688 6688 6789 6789 6664 6664 6662 6662 6086 6086
R2 0.005 0.000 0.037 0.028 0.122 0.120 0.018 -0.103 0.059 0.052 0.092 -0.028 0.093 -0.004
DWHchi2 2.661 1.420 0.205 9.102 0.919 2.110 1.614
DWHpval 0.103 0.233 0.651 0.003 0.338 0.146 0.204
Germanic
1st Stage Result
IV-early 0.035∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.014 -0.021 0.101∗∗ 0.014 0.013
(0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.016) (0.043) (0.046) (0.048)
IV-normal 0.339∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.029) (0.028)
2nd Stage Result
Not work for pay -0.610∗∗∗ -1.037∗∗∗ -0.672∗∗∗ -1.885∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -1.893∗∗∗ -0.340∗∗∗ 3.751∗∗∗ -0.659∗∗∗ -2.094∗∗∗ -0.374∗∗∗ -2.404 -0.333∗∗ -0.867
(0.122) (0.362) (0.129) (0.414) (0.161) (0.465) (0.124) (0.901) (0.133) (0.429) (0.141) (2.216) (0.151) (2.147)
Observations 11172 11172 10166 10166 7441 7441 11172 11172 10166 10166 9788 9788 8802 8802
R2 0.008 0.004 0.065 0.033 0.085 0.055 0.020 -0.303 0.090 0.047 0.096 0.021 0.108 0.104
DWHchi2 0.620 6.444 7.912 25.934 14.978 0.927 0.064
DWHpval 0.431 0.011 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.336 0.801
New SHARE and East Asia
1st Stage Result
IV-early 0.463∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
IV-normal 0.117∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026)
2nd Stage Result
Not work for pay 0.823∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗ -0.246 -1.144 0.871∗∗∗ 1.589∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.222 0.621∗∗∗ 2.359∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 1.774
(0.090) (0.212) (0.090) (0.224) (0.187) (0.856) (0.090) (0.207) (0.092) (0.625) (0.093) (1.203) (0.105) (1.399)
Observations 12807 12807 12629 12629 7413 7413 12807 12807 12629 12629 12606 12606 10705 10705
R2 0.015 0.015 0.038 0.035 0.134 0.124 0.018 0.007 0.129 0.127 0.137 0.078 0.174 0.140
DWHchi2 15.085 2.579 1.012 25.809 0.841 0.304 1.066
DWHpval 0.000 0.108 0.314 0.000 0.359 0.581 0.302
Original
1st Stage Result
IV-early 0.128∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
IV-normal 0.231∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
2nd Stage Result
Not work for pay -1.164∗∗∗ -2.499∗∗∗ -0.994∗∗∗ -2.750∗∗∗ -0.792∗∗∗ -1.626∗∗∗ -1.083∗∗∗ -2.717∗∗∗ -0.813∗∗∗ -2.010∗∗∗ -0.698∗∗∗ -4.853∗∗ -0.608∗∗∗ -3.940∗
(0.065) (0.231) (0.065) (0.248) (0.068) (0.259) (0.066) (0.467) (0.067) (0.284) (0.070) (2.281) (0.072) (2.336)
Observations 20087 20087 18746 18746 16260 16260 20087 20087 18746 18746 18108 18108 16746 16746
R2 0.028 -0.009 0.103 0.041 0.177 0.164 0.032 -0.019 0.145 0.118 0.157 -0.147 0.173 -0.016
DWHchi2 42.834 62.764 9.962 17.998 19.996 3.923 2.110
DWHpval 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.146
All countries
1st Stage Result
IV-early 0.332∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
IV-normal 0.121∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014)
2nd Stage Result
Not work for pay 0.607∗∗∗ 3.684∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 3.186∗∗∗ -0.797∗∗∗ -1.853∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 6.092∗∗∗ 0.069 -1.410∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.073 -0.017 -0.226
(0.063) (0.189) (0.063) (0.182) (0.065) (0.241) (0.065) (0.269) (0.065) (0.264) (0.066) (0.753) (0.070) (0.948)
Observations 32894 32894 31375 31375 23673 23673 32894 32894 31375 31375 30714 30714 27451 27451
R2 0.007 -0.178 0.090 -0.041 0.181 0.160 0.011 -0.542 0.229 0.191 0.239 0.239 0.262 0.261
DWHchi2 81.425 87.093 19.604 462.480 30.384 0.006 0.038
DWHpval 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.940 0.846
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Table 10: The effect of the difference in the definition of retirement and the surveyed age-
group using weight
SR retire Not Work Complete retire
2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010
OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2
Age group: 60-64
1st Stage Result
IV-Early-bi 0.037 0.062∗∗ 0.003 0.022 0.010 0.032
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025)
IV-Normal-bi 0.107∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ -0.003 0.073∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
2nd Stage Result
retirement -0.274∗∗∗ -0.216 -0.393∗∗∗ 1.239 -0.439∗∗∗ -1.415 -0.583∗∗∗ 14.847 -0.398∗∗∗ -0.702 -0.530∗∗∗ 3.577
(0.092) (1.401) (0.107) (1.547) (0.088) (3.615) (0.110) (19.854) (0.089) (2.147) (0.108) (4.303)
Observations 8078 8078 9239 9239 8095 8095 9299 9299 8076 8076 9213 9213
R2 0.171 0.171 0.104 0.064 0.172 0.155 0.105 -3.669 0.172 0.171 0.106 -0.170
DWHchi2 0.008 1.051 0.077 2.926 0.018 1.106
DWHpval 0.930 0.305 0.781 0.087 0.892 0.293
Age group: 60-69
1st Stage Result
IV-Early-bi 0.070∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.029 0.022 0.027 0.028
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
IV-Normal-bi 0.123∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
2nd Stage Result
retirement -0.275∗∗∗ 0.777 -0.319∗∗∗ 0.411 -0.451∗∗∗ 1.527 -0.480∗∗∗ 1.241 -0.422∗∗∗ 1.167 -0.443∗∗∗ 0.490
(0.074) (0.704) (0.087) (0.720) (0.067) (1.328) (0.081) (1.849) (0.067) (1.033) (0.081) (1.263)
Observations 15830 15830 16858 16858 15852 15852 16945 16945 15827 15827 16823 16823
R2 0.168 0.155 0.111 0.105 0.170 0.113 0.112 0.070 0.170 0.132 0.113 0.100
DWHchi2 2.264 0.890 2.383 0.631 2.477 0.390
DWHpval 0.132 0.345 0.123 0.427 0.116 0.532
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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5 Dynamic Analysis
According to the study of cross-country and cross-sectional analysis validity in section
4, the estimation strategy such as the strategy used by Rohwedder and Willis (2010), Coe
and Zamarro (2011), and Bingley and Martinello (2013) is not appropriate for estimating
the effect of retirement on cognitive function. According to the results of the section 4, in
“original without Greece” countries, the effect of retirement on cognitive function is negative,
while the effect of retirement on cognitive function is positive in “new SHARE and East Asia”
countries. The effect of only a part of the analyzed countries influences the final conclusion on
the effect of retirement on cognitive function. As such, we use another identification strategy
in this section to omit the unobserved heterogeneity of individual characteristics. Before
we proceed to the estimation, we discuss the source of the effect of retirement on cognitive
function heterogeneity. In related literatures, Rohwedder and Willis (2010) suggest that it is
possible that the difference in the activity during leisure time influences cognitive function
after retirement. They raise the analysis on this point as a future work. Bonsang et al. (2012)
also suggest that increased social interaction is increased may be an important factor for the
cognitive reserve. We would like to consider these points in a simple framework.
5.1 What Is The Source of The Effect of Retirement on Cognitive
Function Heterogeneity?: A Simple Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we investigate the hypothetical mechanism causing the heterogeneity
of the difference in cognitive function scores between retirees and non-retirees, based on a
simple economic model. This simplified model has a similar structure to Grossman (1972).
Rohwedder and Willis (2010) present a similar idea about the mechanism of a cognitive
function decreases after retirement. Although Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) present a model
as well, retirement is exogenous and there is no asset accumulation. They formulate the utility
function with a cognitive investment itself. As such, we formalize the utility function with
cognitive ability because the latter is a health asset and the cognitive investment increases
this asset. This is the first analysis to present the model with endogenous retirement. (3) is a
simple dynamic model with two cognitive abilities. The following is an elderly’s maximization
problem.
max
{ct,lt,ifWt,ijWt,ifLt,ijLt}Tt=50
T∑
t=50
βt−50u(ct, l˜t, a
f
t , a
j
t)
(50 ≤ t ≤ T )
s.t. At+1 = (1 + r)At + P (lt, R, Pensiont) + yt − ct −G(ifWt, ijWt, ifLt, ijLt)
aft = Af (t, i
f
Wt, i
f
Lt, Xft)
ajt = Aj(t, i
j
Wt, i
j
Lt, Xjt)
l˜t = lt − L(ifLt, ijLt)
yt = y(a
f
t , a
j
t , t, lt) (3)
32
lt ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}
(1− lt) · imMaxWt ≥ imWt ≥ 0 (m = f, j)
ct ≥ 0, l˜t ≥ 0, imnt ≥ 0(m = f, j)(n = W,L), At+1 ≥ 0
(4)
We would like to define the following notations.
• ct: consumption, l˜t: finally consumed leisure time, aft : fundamental cognitive ability,
ajt : job specific cognitive ability.
• lt: leisure time, At: asset, R: pensionable age, Pensiont: pension payment.
• ifWt: fundamental cognitive investment at workplace, ifLt: fundamental cognitive invest-
ment during leisure time, ijWt: job specific cognitive investment at workplace, i
j
Lt: job
specific cognitive investment during leisure time.
• Xft: technological factors of fundamental cognitive ability, Xjt: technological factors
of job specific cognitive ability.
• Af (·): the production function of fundamental cognitive ability, Aj(·): the production
function of job specific cognitive ability.
• P (·): the function of pension payment, G(·): the cost function of cognitive investment,
L(·): the function of reduced time by cognitive investment, y(·): the function of income,
imMaxWt (m = f, j): maximum values of cognitive investment during work time.
We assume that “fundamental cognitive ability” is a basic cognitive ability, such as calcu-
lation, reading, and memory ability. This ability is the target of our analysis. We also
assume that “job specific cognitive ability” is the cognitive ability for a specific job, such
as a computing skill. We would like to explain the important structures of model (3) when
we consider the hypothetical mechanism of retirement heterogeneously influencing cognitive
function.
• The elderly can input cognitive investment at the workplace only when they work. The
maximum amount of investment changes according to the amount of leisure((1 − lt) ·
imMaxWt ≥ imWt ≥ 0(m = f, j)). When the elderly enjoy their leisure time, they can invest
in the cognitive ability. However, these investments reduce leisure(l˜t = lt −L(ifLt, ijLt)).
The elderly finally consumes l˜t as leisure.
• We assume that y(aft+1 = α1, ajt+1 = α2, t + 1, lt+1 = α3) − y(aft = α1, ajt = α2, t, lt =
α3) < 0. In other words, age increase lowers their income. Although the elderly
continue to input the same level of leisure time and have the same level of cognitive
ability, the income continues to decrease as age increases. This is an effect of health on
income: aging reduces the incentive to work progressively.
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• We assume that P (lt, R, Pensiont) = 0 if t ≤ R. When we consider the liquidity
constraint (At ≥ 0), the incentive to work increases when R increases.
• We assume that it is possible that the elderly have a preference for fundamental cogni-
tive ability and job specify ability. As such, it is possible that
∂u(ct,l˜t,a
f
t ,a
j
t )
∂amt
> 0(m = f, j).
This structure produces the incentive to invest in the cognitive ability which is an im-
portant property. This structure also gives the working status two benefits; income
and the opportunity to invest in cognitive abilities at the workplace; this is because
the model has the structure that elderly input cognitive investment at the workplace
only when they work. Additionally, the elderly who have a preference as regards cog-
nitive abilities have the incentive to invest cognitive abilities during leisure time. This
preference provides an incentive to invest in cognitive abilities after retirement.
• The marginal utility of cognitive ability investment is the value of ∂u(ct,l˜t,aft ,ajt )
∂amt
∂amt
∂imnt
(m =
f, j)(n = W,L). In other words, the factors of the cognitive ability production function
are important for deciding the amount of investment when they influence the marginal
productivity of the production function(
∂amt
∂imnt
(m = f, j)).
We parameterize model (3) to discuss the hypothetical mechanism, the specification pre-
sented here being an example. We only present the hypothesis of why the effect of retirement
on cognitive ability is different. The hypotheses should be investigated empirically section.
The details of the parameterization are explained in the Appendix (A.2). We parameterize
the utility function, pension payment function, and cognitive ability functions as follows.
• u(ct, l˜t, aft, ajt) = cγ1t l˜γ2t aγ3fta1−γ1−γ2−γ3jt
• P (lt, R, Pensiont) = 1{lt ≥ 0.5}1{t ≥ R}Pensiont
• Am(t, imWt, imLt, Xmt) = α1imWt+α2imLt+α3Hetro1+α4Hetro2+Am0 exp(−α5t)(m = f, j)
In our “benchmark” model, we set the parameters: γ3 = 0.0, 1 − γ1 − γ2 − γ3 = 0, R =
70, α5 = 0.05. We simulate the economic behavior of 5,000 agents after solving the dynamic
programming. Subsequently, initial asset (A0) and initial cognitive abilities (Am0(m = f, j))
are taken from a distribution. We observe the influence of the average value of Am0 of the
initial distribution. The vertical line of all figures indicates the average value of each variable
for all agents. The start of the value of the horizontal line in each figure means “age 50.” In
other words, age 1 means age 51.
• The influence of the difference in preference of cognitive ability: in Figure 9, we analyze
the effect of the change in the parameter of fundamental cognitive ability in the utility
function. We only change parameter γ3 = 0.0 (“benchmark” model) into γ3 = 0.2
in the “without preference” case. In the “with preference” case, the elderly start to
retire around age 70 (horizontal line = 20). Then, the fundamental cognitive invest-
ment during leisure time also increases simultaneously in the “with preference” case.
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On the other hand, in the “without preference” case, the fundamental cognitive invest-
ment during leisure time does not increase simultaneously in the “without preference”
case. This is the effect of preference change on cognitive investment behavior. In the
“without preference” case, the incentive to increase leisure is large. As a result, the
elderly without fundamental cognitive ability preference retire earlier in the “without
preference” case. Additionally, fundamental cognitive investment at workplace also
decreases earlier in the “without preference” case. Consequently, the effect of retire-
ment on cognitive function is considered to be the difference in cognitive investment
behaviors (both during leisure time and at the workplace) before and after retirement.
The mechanism to change cognitive ability by retirement is that the elderly change
investment behavior after retirement. As a result, the effect of retirement on the cog-
nitive function becomes heterogeneous in both cases through the change in cognitive
investment behaviors before and after retirement.
• The influence of the difference in initial cognitive ability level: in Figure 10, we analyze
the effect of the average value of Am0 of the initial distribution. We only change the
average value of Am0 into a lower average value in “high initial ability.” In this case, the
heterogeneity of the effect of retirement on cognitive function is unclear (the difference
in cognitive investment behaviors before and after retirement). In all behaviors, there
is no difference between the two types. As such, the effect of retirement on cognitive
function may be weak because the effect of retirement on cognitive investment behaviors
is considered to be the difference in investment behaviors before and after retirement.
• The influence of the difference in technological factor of cognitive ability production
function: in Figure 11, we only change the parameter α5 = 0.05 (“benchmark” model)
into α5 = 0.025 in the “high tech” case. In this case, there is a difference in cognitive
investment behaviors between the two cases(“high tech” case vs “low tech” case). How-
ever, the heterogeneity of the effect of retirement on cognitive function is clear because
cognitive investment behaviors heterogeneity is large.
• The influence of the pension eligibility age on investment activity: In Figure 12, when
we change the pensionable age 70 into age 65, the average leisure time increases at
the same age “Pension Eligibility Age 70” and “Pension Eligibility Age 65” in both
cases. Cognitive investment behavior at the workplace also sharply decreases at the
pensionable age. The retirement behavior is strongly influenced by whether an elderly
arrives at their pensionable age. In other words, we can use the pensionable age as an
IV to control for the endogeneity of cognitive investment behaviors, which we include
in our empirical estimation.
We have discussed the source of the effect of retirement on cognitive abilities heterogeneity
as the heterogeneity of cognitive investment behaviors before and after retirement (both
during leisure time and at the workplace). As such, we perform an empirical analysis based
on the discussion in this section.
Finally, we discuss the relationship between model analysis in this section and public
health literature. In public health literature, numerous studies focus on the determinants of
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Figure 9: The Influence of the Difference in Preference to Cognitive Ability (Without Preference
to Fundamental Cognitive Ability vs Without Preference to Fundamental Cognitive Ability)
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cognitive function, as in the relationship between cognitive function and lifestyle habits or
between cognitive ability and human behaviors (physical activity and lifestyle habits such
as leisure time activity)(Dik et al. (2003), Scarmeas and Stern (2003), Wilson et al. (2003),
Nyberg et al. (2012), Raji et al. (2016), Satizabal et al. (2016)). The effect of these activities
on cognitive function is the cognitive investment behaviors during leisure time heterogeneity.
We consider the heterogeneity of activities during leisure time in the empirical section.
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Figure 10: The Influence of the Difference in Initial Cognitive Ability Level (High Initial Funda-
mental Cognitive Ability vs Low Initial Fundamental Cognitive Ability)
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Figure 11: The Influence of the Difference in Technological Factor of Cognitive Ability Production
Function (High Technology vs Low Technology)
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Figure 12: The Influence of the Pension Eligibility Age (Pensionable Age 70 vs Pensionable Age
65)
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5.2 Estimation Strategy
In this section, we use the dynamic variation of retirement behavior on cognitive function
while, in section 5.3, we analyze the effect of retirement on cognitive functions in the U.S.,
England, France, Germany, Denmark, Korea, and Japan, as the information on the correct
pension eligibility age in these countries is available. We also use the exogenous variation
of whether a respondent arrives at his/her pension eligibility age to control for retirement
endogeneity. We analyze the effect of whether a respondent retires on cognitive function
in the same section.
In Nishimura and Oikawa (2017), we analyze the effect of the difference in the retire-
ment duration on cognitive function only in the U.S. In this analysis, we use the exogenous
variation of the difference in the pension eligibility age among different cohorts, which de-
termines retirement timing. We use this variation for retirement duration in our analysis.
In this section, we analyze only the U.S. To analyze the effect of retirement duration on
cognitive function, we have to use the exogenous variation of the difference in the pension
eligibility age among different cohorts which can be obtained solely for the U.S. Figure 13
shows the targets of our analysis and describes the goal of each section. We split our analysis
into two parts after this section: first, we analyze the effect of the transition from working to
retirement status on cognitive function; second, we analyze the effect of retirement duration
on cognitive function scores (with respect to retirees only).
Figure 13: The Analysis Targets
Age
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Not	Work
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(Target	1)	Section	5.3:
Retirement	Analysis
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Nishimura	and	Oikawa	(2017):
Retirement	Duration	Analysis
Cognitive	Function
As per Figure 14, there are two retirement stages in all countries. From 50 to 70, the elderly
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start to retire having a comparatively short retirement duration. From 70 to 80, almost all
elderly retire. The elderly aged more than 70 have a long retirement duration. As such, we
analyze the effect of retirement on cognitive ability separately in these two stages. However,
related studies do not analyze the elderly over 80 (Table 11), and only the first stage of
retirement (comparatively short retirement duration). We add the analysis of the second
stage of retirement. However, in the second stage, there are few elderly who do not retire.
We focus on the effect of the difference in the retirement duration on cognitive ability only
among retirees.
Figure 14: Labor Force Participation Rate
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In the section 5.1., we discussed the following heterogeneity aspects on which base our
empirical analysis:
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Table 11: Age Range in The Related Literatures
The Literatures Using Panel Structure Age Range
Bonsang et al. (2012) 51-75
Coe et al. (2012) Less than 80
Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) 50-70
• The influence of the difference in preference to cognitive ability;
• The influence of the difference in initial cognitive ability level;
• The influence of the difference in technological factors of cognitive ability production
function.
We find that the above heterogeneities can influence the heterogeneities of investment behav-
iors during leisure time. In the empirical analysis, we consider the heterogeneity of the initial
cognitive score (initial cognitive ability), of activities during leisure time, and of individual
characteristics (e.g., gender, which is a technological factor of the cognitive ability production
function). However, we do not observe the preference for cognitive ability but we consider
the transition of leisure time activity before and after retirement. However, the initial cog-
nitive ability level and some technological factors are observed. Subsequently, we separate
the sample depending on the heterogeneity of observable characteristics, which allows us to
control for the direct effect by controlled heterogeneity of cognitive investment behaviors.
However, some characteristics we consider for the separation of the sample (e.g., BMI) are
difficult to interpret. For example, we could not determine which factor (preference, initial
cognitive ability, technology) BMI describes. This is a limitation of the analysis.
The HRS collects the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS). Section A of the
CAMS explains that “The activities component of the CAMS allows for describing activity
patterns and permits the investigation of different types of activities and how specific types
of activities are affected by health, family, and economic transitions in later life and, in turn,
how activities affect health and well-being.” 21 We use the CAMS data of the time consumed
in leisure activities of a respondent before and after retirement.
The importance of the effect of retirement on cognitive function heterogeneity is signifi-
cant. We only analyze the effect of retirement on cognitive function for individual countries.
Therefore, we cannot derive a general conclusion with respect to the effect of retirement on
cognitive function, as results may vary according to the analyzed country. However, this ef-
fect can be analyzed for other countries if data variation to identify the effect of retirement on
cognitive function is employed and a panel dataset with enough waves for long-term analysis
is used. If we can obtain the variation of the change in pension eligibility age among different
cohorts, we can analyze the effect of retirement on cognitive function in both frameworks of
this paper (retirement analysis and retirement duration analysis). When we use panel data
with enough waves, including respondents who have different pension eligibility ages in some
countries, we can analyze the effect of retirement on cognitive function in these countries.
21Refer to the website at https://ssl.isr.umich.edu/hrs/filedownload2.php?d=522 for further details.
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We expect future research to consider the importance of the heterogeneity of the effect of
retirement on cognitive function in countries other than those analyzed in this paper.
5.3 Retirement Analysis
5.3.1 Analysis Framework
As discussed in section 4, the country heterogeneity cannot be ignored. As a result, we
analyze each country, while omitting the unobserved heterogeneity. Our analysis includes the
U.S., England, France, Germany, Denmark, Korea, and Japan because the correct informa-
tion on the pension eligibility age and the number of waves of datasets for dynamic analysis
are available. The identification strategy in this section is to use the variation of whether
a respondent arrives at the pension eligibility age: we analyze the effect of whether a re-
spondent retires on cognitive function. We use the fundamental cognitive ability equation
in the model (3) and derive the following equation from the fundamental cognitive ability
equation.
aft = Af (t, i
f
Wt, i
f
Lt, Xft) = α0 + α1i
f
Wt + α2i
f
Lt + γ
′Xft + ft (5)
Let aft = cognition scoreit + ˜1t and α1iWt + α2iLt = βretireit + ˜2t. cognition scoreit is
cognitive test scores. retireit is an indicator of whether a respondent retires. In other words,
a cognitive score is a proxy of cognitive ability, and retirement status is a proxy of a cognitive
ability investment activity. Finally, we derive the following equation from equation (5).
cognition scoreit = α0 + βretireit + γ
′Xft + ft − ˜1t + ˜2t
We estimate the following equation.
cognition scoreit = β0 + β1retireit + γ
′xit + a1i + λ1t + 1it (6)
retireit = α0 + α11{ageit ≥ Aebi }+ α21{ageit ≥ Afbi }
+α11{ageit ≥ Aebi }ageit + α21{ageit ≥ Afbi }ageit + η′xit + a2i + λ2t + 2i (7)
Aebi : the early retirement benefit eligibility age
Afbi : the full retirement benefit eligibility age
retireit is an indicator equal to one when a respondent retires at period t. λ1t and λ2t are
time fixed effects. a1i and a2i are individual fixed effects. xit are control variables at period
t.
As discussed in section 4.2., with respect to the control variables included in the estima-
tion model, what should be included is difficult to determine. As in section 4, we include
demographic factors, such as gender, family structure, and economic variables, in the esti-
mation model to control for the fundamental social factors that influence human behavior.
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There are two ways to we define whether “a respondent retires.” The first definition
of retirement is based on the self-reported retirement status. In the first definition, we
define that “a respondent retire” when “self-reported retire” variable is equal to the value of
one. This is the same definition of retirement “self-reported retire” in the section 3.1 (the
definition based on the variable “r@lbrf”). See the detail of the footnote 11. Some studies
use the self-reported information. (Coe et al. (2012) and Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012))
The second definition is that “a respondent retire” when a respondent does not work for pay.
This definition is the most popular in the previous studies.22 We do not follow any definition
used in the literatures. We define that “a respondent retire” when a respondent do “not
work for pay” and “self-reported retire.” We call this retirement definition “complete retire.”
We use the definition of complete retire, since using “self-reported retirement” could include
samples working for payment although retired who invest in cognitive abilities, sample which
we omit. On the other hand, if we use the definition of not work for pay, the sample looking
for jobs may also invest more than retirees. We also omit these samples.
The analyzed age range for each country is shown in Table 12. We choose these age ranges
of each country based on Figure 14, based on whether a respondent retires, among same age
respondents. For example, in France, most people do not work for pay at 70, thus showing
no variation in whether a respondent retires among respondents above 70. However, some
Japanese people still work at 80. Finally, we analyze only the samples who do not conform
to complete retire at least once in this analysis, because we want to omit the respondents
who both have not worked for pay and retired at an early age.
Table 12: Age Range for Retirement Analysis
Country Age range
US 50-79
England 50-69
Germany 50-69
France 50-69
Denmark 50-69
Japan 50+
Korea 50-79
As in section 5.1, the heterogeneity of the model produces the heterogeneous transition
pattern of cognitive investment during leisure time before and after retirement. We consider
the heterogeneity of the transition pattern of cognitive investment during leisure time. In
all analyzed countries, there is a question on social attendance in the surveys. We use this
variable to obtain information about transition before and after retirement. Especially in
the U.S., we can obtain detailed information on the amount of time spent in each activity
from the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS). We show the transition of time
spent in each activity before and after retirement in Table 13. In almost all activities, there
22Many studies use this definition. For example, Rohwedder and Willis (2010), Coe and Zamarro (2011),
Bonsang et al. (2012), Bingley and Martinello (2013), Hashimoto (2013) and Hashimoto (2015).
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is a difference before and after retirement, with the hours of watching TV showing the most
significant change. The time spent using computer decreases after retirement as a direct
result of it, as the elderly use computers in their offices otherwise. We pay attention to the
heterogeneity of time spent watching TV and time spent for social attendance before and
after retirement in the U.S. Certain studies (Eskelinen et al. (2008), Devore et al. (2009))
report that there is a relationship between fat intake and cognitive function. As such, we
consider the heterogeneity of BMI and the amount of fat intake, using the 2013 dataset of
the Health Care and Nutrition Study, although the year of the survey is not consistent with
our analysis years. However, we consider that the amount of fat intake in 2013 is a proxy of
the amount of fat intake in other years. However, it is possible that the amount of fat intake
during the lifetime of the respondents forms a technological factor of a cognitive decline,
while BMI is also a proxy of a cognitive decline technological factor. These heterogeneities
are not analyzed in extant studies.
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Table 13: The Amount of Time Spent in Each Activity Before and After Retirement (Hours)
(1) (2) (3)
Activities Not retired Retired (2)-(1)
Working for pay 3.9 0.1 -3.8
Using the computer 1.7 0.6 -1.1
Wacthing TV 2.5 3.4 0.9
Walking 1.1 0.8 -0.3
Attending social activities 2 2.2 0.2
Reading newspapers 0.6 0.8 0.2
Listening to music 1.1 0.9 -0.2
House cleaning 0.6 0.8 0.2
Preparing meals and cleaning-up afterwards 0.8 1 0.2
Sleeping and napping 6.7 6.6 -0.1
Visiting in-person with friends 1 1.1 0.1
Washing, ironing, or mending clothes 0.3 0.4 0.1
Yard work or gardening 0.3 0.4 0.1
Playing cards or games, or solving puzzles 0.1 0.2 0.1
Reading books 0.5 0.6 0.1
Praying or meditating 0.5 0.6 0.1
Shopping or running errands 0.5 0.6 0.1
Physically showing affection 0.5 0.4 -0.1
Treating or managing an existing medical condition 0.2 0.3 0.1
Participating sports 0.3 0.3 0
Communicating by phone,letters, e-mail 0.8 0.8 0
Personal grooming 1 1 0
Caring for pets 0.4 0.4 0
Helping friends 0.2 0.2 0
Doing volunteer work 0.1 0.1 0
Attending religious services 0.1 0.1 0
Attending meetings of clubs or religious groups 0.1 0.1 0
Taking care of finances or investments 0.1 0.1 0
Attending concerts, movies 0 0 0
Singing or playing a musical instrument 0 0 0
Doing arts and crafts projects 0.1 0.1 0
Doing home improvements 0.1 0.1 0
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5.3.2 Results
We discuss the estimated results only when the coefficients of IV in the first stage are
significant, and analyze only male elderly in Japan because we cannot obtain the significant
results in the first stage estimation when we include female elderly. We also test the en-
dogeneity of retirement with the DWH test. When we do not reject the null hypothesis,
we support the results of fixed effects (FE) model. “IV-bi-E(N)” is dummy that indicates
whether a respondent reaches pensionable age. “IV-bi-E(N)-Age” is a cross term of the
variable “IV-bi-E(N)” and age.
• Full sample: in Table 14, we show the results of full sample. First, in many countries,
we do not find a negative effect of retirement on cognitive function. However, in the
U.S., there is a negative effect of retirement on cognitive function in both scores (word
recall summary and serial 7s). In Korea, only in serial 7s there is a negative effect of
retirement on cognitive function. As such, it is possible that the effect of retirement
on cognitive function is heterogeneous depending on the analyzed countries. Although
the effect of retirement on cognitive function is negative, the magnitude is very small.
• Heterogeneity of characteristics: in Tables 15, 16, and 17, we show the results of het-
erogeneous groups by types of cognitive function scores:
– Word recall summary scores: are presented in in Tables 15 and 16. In the U.S.,
there is a negative effect of retirement on word recall summary scores in almost all
groups. However, in other countries, the effect is heterogeneous among different
groups. In the U.S., the magnitude is very similar among heterogeneous groups.
This suggests that the difference in the characteristics considered in Tables 15 and
16 is not important for explaining the effect of retirement on the score in the U.S.
The magnitude is also limited in all groups. In Korea, we can find that the effect
of retirement on the score is negative only in female and male groups. However,
the effect is weak. Except for the U.S. and Korea, we do not find that there is
a heterogeneous effect of retirement on the score when controlling for retirement
endogeneity and omitting the unobserved heterogeneity. In England, there is a
positive effect of retirement on the score in some groups (WR: England LTC,
WR: England Initial score-, Initial score+). In France, Germany and Denmark,
in almost all groups, there is no effect of retirement on the score except for the
blue-collar group (WR: France Blue, WR: Germany Blue).
– Serial 7 and backward counting: in Table 17, we show the results of serial 7s score
and backward counting, although not available in the SHARE and the ELSA.
We only show the results for the U.S, Korea, and Japan. In the serial 7s score,
there is a negative effect of retirement on the score among almost all groups in
all countries. However, there is no effect of retirement on the score in the elderly
with college degree in all countries. In backward counting, there is no effect of
retirement on the score in the U.S. among all groups.
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• Heterogeneity of leisure time, fat intake, and BMI: in Tables 18, 19, and 20, we show
the results of the word recall summary score, serial 7s score, and backward counting,
considering the heterogeneity of activities during leisure time, BMI, and fat intake.
“SAInc” (“SANInc”) means that the elderly increase (do not increase) their social
attendance immediately after retirement. We can define both “TVNInc” and “TVInc”
similarly. “TVInc SANinc” describes that the elderly increase the amount of time spent
watching TV and do not increase social attendance. This is prepared for separating the
sample based on the heterogeneity of leisure time in more detail. Watching TV is one of
the fluctuating factors in the category of time spent before and after retirement. With
respect to social attendance, it seems that there is not a systematic difference in the
effect of retirement on the score among different groups, considering the heterogeneity
of leisure time activity. In Table 18, the elderly who increase social attendance decrease
Word Recall Summary Score after retirement. In Table 19, there is also not a systematic
difference in the effect of retirement on the score. It is possible that social attendance
does not cause effect of retirement on the cognitive score heterogeneity. It may be
difficult to interpret social attendance as an investment behavior on cognitive function.
In Table 18, the elderly with “BMI25-” identifies the elderly who have a BMI value
lower than 25 at the first response, and “BMI25+” represents the elderly who have
a BMI value above 25 at the first response. “Fat-” identifies the elderly whose fat
intake is less than the 2013 median, while “Fat+” is for the elderly whose fat intake is
above the 2013 median. According to Table 20, it is possible that BMI and fat intake
are sources of heterogeneity of the effect of retirement on cognitive function. In the
word recall summary score, both “BMI25+” and “BMI25-” indicate a negative effect of
retirement on cognitive function. However, the magnitude of “BMI25+” is larger than
that of “BMI25-”(WR: US, BMI25-, BMI25+). In the serial 7’s score, only “BMI25+”
and “Fat+” indicate the negative effect of retirement on cognitive function(S7: US,
BMI25+, Fat+).
Finally, we interpret the estimated results based on the analysis in section 5.1. We have
considered the effect of retirement on cognitive scores from the following points:
• (1) The Influence of the Difference in Preference to Cognitive Ability
• (2) The Influence of the Difference in Initial Cognitive Ability Level
• (3) The Influence of the Difference in Technological Factor of Cognitive Ability Pro-
duction Function
With respect to (2), an initial cognitive ability is not a systematic factor for deciding the
heterogeneity of the effect of retirement on cognitive ability according to our analysis, be-
cause the heterogeneity of initial cognitive ability is important only in the U.S. With respect
to (3), gender difference, as an example of technological factors does not seem to be a sys-
tematic factor that produces the heterogeneity of the effect of retirement on cognitive ability.
According to our analysis, the heterogeneity of the analyzed country seems more important
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than the heterogeneity of the analyzed group. In the U.S., almost all groups indicate an
negative effect of retirement on cognitive score in word recall summary score and serial 7’s.
Based on the results of BMI and fat intake, eating habits may be an important factor in
explaining the heterogeneity of the effect of retirement on cognitive function. Eating habits
are heterogeneous in each country.
Finally, we consider what fat intake and BMI describe. The first possibility is a proxy
of preference. Based on model (3), the investment behaviors after retirement depend on the
preference of cognitive ability. The second possibility is a technological factor that influ-
ences the effect of cognitive investment behaviors on cognitive function. The following is an
example:
Am(t, i
m
Wt, i
m
Lt, Xmt) = (α1i
m
Wt + α2i
m
Lt) ·BMI + α3Hetro1 + α4Hetro2 + Am0 exp(−t)
(α1 > 0, α2 > 0)
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Table 14: Retirement Analysis (Full Sample): Word Recall Summary Score, Serial7’s Back-
ward Counting
WR: US WR: England WR: France WR: Germany WR: Denmark WR: Korea
Full Full Full Full Full Full
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.074∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.974∗∗
(0.008) (0.038) (0.043) (0.028) (0.443)
IV-bi-N 1.192∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 5.091∗∗∗ 0.354 3.725∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗
(0.232) (0.011) (1.934) (1.691) (1.361) (0.020)
IV-bi-E - Age 0.017∗∗
(0.008)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.018∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.078∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.057∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.000) (0.030) (0.026) (0.021)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.149∗∗∗ 0.099 0.067 0.467 0.018 -0.477 -0.144 0.612 -0.200 2.053 -0.098∗∗∗ 2.326∗∗
(0.029) (0.318) (0.056) (0.397) (0.167) (0.817) (0.201) (1.903) (0.195) (2.004) (0.029) (1.036)
Observations 70542 70542 23923 23923 3998 3998 2365 2365 3497 3497 14127 14127
DWHpval 0.402 0.305 0.549 0.693 0.224 0.019
S7: US BWC: US S7: Korea
Full Full Full
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ -0.974∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.443)
IV-bi-N 1.192∗∗∗ 1.192∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗
(0.232) (0.232) (0.020)
IV-bi-E - Age 0.017∗∗
(0.008)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.028∗∗ -0.305∗∗ -0.001 0.017 -0.122∗∗∗ 0.614
(0.013) (0.137) (0.002) (0.023) (0.032) (1.140)
Observations 70542 70542 70542 70542 14129 14129
DWHpval 0.042 0.480 0.518
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 15: Retirement Analysis (By Group): Word Recall Summary Score
WR: US WR: England WR: France WR: Korea
Male Male Male Male
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.091∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ -1.613∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.049) (0.511)
IV-bi-N 1.160∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ -0.142∗ -0.030
(0.342) (0.019) (0.085) (0.024)
IV-bi-E - Age 0.029∗∗∗
(0.009)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.017∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.005) (0.000)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.121∗∗∗ -0.727 -0.022 -0.415 -0.217 -0.935 -0.130∗∗∗ 0.538
(0.044) (0.458) (0.083) (0.663) (0.251) (1.296) (0.043) (0.862)
Observations 31551 31551 11645 11645 1877 1877 8149 8149
DWHpval 0.186 0.557 0.562 0.436
WR: US WR: England WR: France WR: Germany WR: Denmark WR: Korea
Female Female Female Female Female Female
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.060∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗ -0.030 -0.049∗
(0.010) (0.052) (0.065) (0.043) (0.029)
IV-bi-N 1.251∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 4.847∗ 0.887 5.589∗∗∗ -0.049∗
(0.317) (0.014) (2.667) (2.835) (2.104) (0.028)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.018∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.073∗ -0.014 -0.085∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.000) (0.041) (0.044) (0.032)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.168∗∗∗ 0.661 0.124∗ 0.679 0.174 -0.478 0.085 1.144 -0.257 0.498 -0.069∗ -0.008
(0.040) (0.450) (0.075) (0.551) (0.223) (1.080) (0.249) (1.640) (0.280) (1.865) (0.041) (1.104)
Observations 38991 38991 12278 12278 2121 2121 1265 1265 1735 1735 5978 5978
DWHpval 0.050 0.293 0.535 0.464 0.701 0.956
WR: US WR: England WR: France WR: Germany WR: Denmark WR: Korea
LTC LTC LTC LTC LTC LTC
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.081∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.036 -0.807∗
(0.009) (0.050) (0.059) (0.040) (0.471)
IV-bi-N 1.288∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 3.584 0.409 3.608∗ -0.034
(0.271) (0.013) (2.699) (2.159) (2.026) (0.021)
IV-bi-E - Age 0.014∗
(0.008)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.019∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.055 -0.007 -0.054∗
(0.004) (0.000) (0.041) (0.033) (0.031)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.138∗∗∗ 0.180 0.092 0.547 -0.001 -0.448 -0.091 0.890 -0.115 1.895 -0.103∗∗∗ 2.792∗∗
(0.033) (0.339) (0.066) (0.396) (0.214) (1.002) (0.220) (1.561) (0.263) (1.949) (0.031) (1.283)
Observations 53319 53319 16079 16079 2500 2500 1541 1541 1710 1710 12683 12683
DWHpval 0.335 0.250 0.634 0.517 0.276 0.024
WR: US WR: England WR: France WR: Denmark WR: Korea
College College College College College
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.050∗∗∗ 0.081 -0.063∗ -2.797∗∗
(0.015) (0.066) (0.038) (1.346)
IV-bi-N 0.922∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 8.519∗∗∗ 3.828∗∗ -0.080
(0.448) (0.025) (3.115) (1.818) (0.060)
IV-bi-E - Age 0.050∗∗
(0.024)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.014∗∗ -0.000 -0.132∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗
(0.007) (0.000) (0.048) (0.028)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.179∗∗∗ -0.306 -0.001 -0.538 0.163 0.288 -0.238 1.624 -0.061 -0.011
(0.064) (0.882) (0.128) (2.158) (0.304) (1.408) (0.283) (3.088) (0.091) (1.080)
Observations 17209 17209 5075 5075 1213 1213 1779 1779 1439 1439
DWHpval 0.926 0.903 0.906 0.542 0.964
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 16: Retirement Analysis (By Group): Word Recall Summary Score
WR: US WR: England WR: France WR: Germany WR: Denmark WR: Korea
White White White White White White
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.058∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗ -2.250∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.044) (0.049) (0.029) (0.754)
IV-bi-N 1.023∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 7.105∗∗∗ 0.226 3.459∗∗ -0.075∗∗
(0.278) (0.015) (2.651) (2.080) (1.542) (0.033)
IV-bi-E - Age 0.040∗∗∗
(0.013)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.015∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.110∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.053∗∗
(0.004) (0.000) (0.041) (0.032) (0.024)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.170∗∗∗ -0.446 0.034 0.029 0.186 -1.284 -0.053 0.764 -0.023 -0.831 -0.049 0.036
(0.037) (0.432) (0.078) (0.666) (0.247) (1.138) (0.287) (1.808) (0.260) (2.556) (0.050) (0.805)
Observations 47517 47517 12435 12435 2517 2517 1445 1445 2649 2649 4794 4794
DWHpval 0.560 0.930 0.162 0.750 0.790 0.917
WR: US WR: England WR: France WR: Germany
Blue Blue Blue Blue
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.108∗∗∗ 0.107 0.142∗
(0.016) (0.072) (0.082)
IV-bi-N 1.757∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 7.235∗ -7.600∗∗
(0.473) (0.016) (3.814) (3.214)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.027∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.108∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.007) (0.000) (0.058) (0.049)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.061 0.264 0.111 0.771 -0.772∗ -2.721 -1.148∗∗ 0.287
(0.059) (0.481) (0.079) (0.493) (0.407) (2.019) (0.540) (2.856)
Observations 17315 17315 11407 11407 906 906 521 521
DWHpval 0.504 0.174 0.352 0.574
WR: US WR: England WR: Germany
Initial score- Initial score- Initial score-
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.069∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗
(0.017) (0.085)
IV-bi-N 1.847∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ -0.042
(0.560) (0.019) (4.851)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.028∗∗∗ 0.000 0.004
(0.009) (0.000) (0.074)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.244∗∗∗ -0.998 0.091 1.838∗∗ 0.297 3.636
(0.059) (0.660) (0.099) (0.803) (0.501) (2.622)
Observations 15733 15733 7342 7342 501 501
DWHpval 0.227 0.031 0.119
WR: US WR: England WR: France WR: Germany
Initial score+ Initial score+ Initial score+ Initial score+
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.057∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗
(0.012) (0.083) (0.093)
IV-bi-N 1.319∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 1.079 15.366∗∗
(0.396) (0.016) (5.167) (7.445)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.020∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.017 -0.236∗∗
(0.006) (0.000) (0.079) (0.114)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.170∗∗∗ -0.370 0.060 1.129∗∗ -0.325 -1.664 -0.182 -0.899
(0.047) (0.636) (0.077) (0.542) (0.342) (1.753) (0.490) (1.236)
Observations 28451 28451 11868 11868 1024 1024 512 512
DWHpval 0.831 0.042 0.428 0.323
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 17: Retirement Analysis (By Group): Serial7’s and Backward Counting
S7: US S7: US S7: Japan S7: Korea S7: Korea BWC: US BWC: US
Male Female Male Male Female Male Female
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.091∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ -1.614∗∗∗ 0.008 0.091∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.511) (0.775) (0.011) (0.010)
IV-bi-N 1.160∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗ -1.786∗∗ -0.030 -0.047 1.160∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗
(0.342) (0.317) (0.905) (0.024) (0.033) (0.342) (0.317)
IV-bi-E - Age 0.029∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.009) (0.014)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.014 -0.027 -0.037∗∗ -0.443∗∗ -0.169∗ -0.118 -0.133∗∗∗ 1.161 -0.101∗∗ 0.578 -0.000 0.049 -0.001 -0.015
(0.018) (0.184) (0.017) (0.201) (0.089) (0.927) (0.046) (0.908) (0.046) (1.200) (0.003) (0.034) (0.003) (0.033)
Observations 31551 31551 38991 38991 2299 2299 8151 8151 5978 5978 31551 31551 38991 38991
DWHpval 0.941 0.041 0.919 0.154 0.571 0.159 0.661
S7: US S7: US S7: Japan S7: Korea S7: Korea BWC: US BWC: US
LTC College College LTC College LTC College
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.081∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ -0.807∗ -2.797∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.015) (0.471) (1.346) (0.009) (0.015)
IV-bi-N 1.288∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗ -3.403∗∗ -0.034 -0.080 1.288∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗
(0.271) (0.448) (1.682) (0.021) (0.060) (0.271) (0.448)
IV-bi-E - Age 0.014∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.008) (0.024)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.019∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ 0.054∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.027) (0.004) (0.007)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.026∗ -0.342∗∗ -0.028 -0.032 0.007 0.269 -0.134∗∗∗ 0.717 0.002 0.701 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 0.116∗∗
(0.014) (0.153) (0.025) (0.313) (0.207) (1.084) (0.035) (1.422) (0.076) (1.058) (0.003) (0.026) (0.004) (0.055)
Observations 53319 53319 17209 17209 505 505 12685 12685 1439 1439 53319 53319 17209 17209
DWHpval 0.038 0.969 0.815 0.549 0.507 0.881 0.026
S7: US S7: US S7: Japan S7: Korea S7: Korea BWC: US BWC: US
White Blue Blue White Blue White Blue
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.058∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ -2.250∗∗∗ 0.229 0.058∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.016) (0.754) (0.564) (0.009) (0.016)
IV-bi-N 1.023∗∗∗ 1.757∗∗∗ -2.917∗∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.006 1.023∗∗∗ 1.757∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.473) (1.344) (0.033) (0.025) (0.278) (0.473)
IV-bi-E - Age 0.040∗∗∗ -0.004
(0.013) (0.010)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.015∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.021) (0.004) (0.007)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.025 -0.338∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.054 -0.280∗∗ 0.497 -0.086∗ 0.730 -0.115∗∗∗ -2.392 0.000 0.027 -0.002 -0.001
(0.015) (0.181) (0.026) (0.225) (0.139) (0.992) (0.049) (0.847) (0.044) (3.753) (0.003) (0.030) (0.005) (0.041)
Observations 47517 47517 17315 17315 1021 1021 4794 4794 8544 8544 47517 47517 17315 17315
DWHpval 0.080 0.990 0.423 0.333 0.543 0.405 0.985
S7: US S7: US
Initial score- Initial score+
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.076∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.012)
IV-bi-N 2.694∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗
(0.594) (0.384)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.041∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.009) (0.006)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.095∗∗∗ -0.100 -0.009 -0.435
(0.031) (0.286) (0.018) (0.279)
Observations 14192 14192 29992 29992
DWHpval 0.974 0.101
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 18: Retirement Analysis (Leisure Time): Word Recall Summary, Serial7’s and Back-
ward Counting
WR: US WR: US WR: England WR: England
SAInc SANInc SAInc SANInc
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.051∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022)
IV-bi-N 0.041∗ 0.035 0.158∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.017)
IV-bi-N - Age 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.277∗∗ 0.217 0.062 2.040 -0.097 -2.898∗∗ 0.081 0.793
(0.124) (2.129) (0.131) (1.588) (0.195) (1.364) (0.107) (0.732)
Observations 3935 3935 3842 3842 1640 1640 5732 5732
DWHpval 0.821 0.198 0.021 0.339
S7: US S7: US
SAInc SANInc
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.051∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022)
IV-bi-N 0.041∗ 0.035
(0.023) (0.023)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.001 -0.756 -0.021 0.209
(0.052) (0.961) (0.057) (0.673)
Observations 3935 3935 3842 3842
DWHpval 0.438 0.760
BWC: US BWC: US
SAInc SANInc
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.051∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022)
IV-bi-N 0.041∗ 0.035
(0.023) (0.023)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.009 -0.229 -0.002 -0.159
(0.009) (0.177) (0.011) (0.119)
Observations 3935 3935 3842 3842
DWHpval 0.145 0.173
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 19: Retirement Analysis (Leisure Time): Word Recall Summary, Serial7’s and Back-
ward Counting
WR: US WR: US WR: US WR: US
TVInc TVInc SANInc TVNInc TVNInc SAInc
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.076∗∗∗ 0.077∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.020) (0.040) (0.022) (0.031)
IV-bi-N 0.051∗∗ 1.260 0.014 0.039
(0.022) (1.258) (0.023) (0.033)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.019
(0.019)
2nd stage
Complete retire 0.070 0.857 0.295∗ 1.965 -0.383∗∗∗ 2.101 -0.455∗∗ -1.388
(0.121) (1.430) (0.172) (1.575) (0.130) (3.122) (0.180) (2.718)
Observations 4291 4291 2095 2095 3801 3801 1844 1844
DWHpval 0.591 0.258 0.403 0.701
S7: US S7: US S7: US S7: US
TVInc TVInc SANInc TVNInc TVNInc SAInc
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.076∗∗∗ 0.077∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.020) (0.040) (0.022) (0.031)
IV-bi-N 0.051∗∗ 1.260 0.014 0.039
(0.022) (1.258) (0.023) (0.033)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.019
(0.019)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.084 -0.724 -0.156∗∗ -0.761 0.059 1.477 0.037 -0.358
(0.051) (0.641) (0.074) (0.707) (0.056) (1.421) (0.075) (1.181)
Observations 4291 4291 2095 2095 3801 3801 1844 1844
DWHpval 0.338 0.376 0.267 0.735
BWC: US BWC: US BWC: US BWC: US
TVInc TVInc SANInc TVNInc TVNInc SAInc
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.076∗∗∗ 0.077∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.020) (0.040) (0.022) (0.031)
IV-bi-N 0.051∗∗ 1.260 0.014 0.039
(0.022) (1.258) (0.023) (0.033)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.019
(0.019)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.001 -0.198∗ 0.003 -0.125 -0.011 -0.109 -0.016 -0.158
(0.009) (0.110) (0.014) (0.115) (0.011) (0.237) (0.014) (0.226)
Observations 4291 4291 2095 2095 3801 3801 1844 1844
DWHpval 0.027 0.212 0.672 0.476
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 20: Retirement Analysis (BMI and Fat intake): Word Recall Summary, Serial7’s and
Backward Counting
WR: US WR: US WR: US WR: US
BMI25- BMI25+ Fat- Fat+
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018)
IV-bi-N 0.630 1.466∗∗∗ 1.641∗∗∗ -0.225
(0.399) (0.286) (0.544) (0.553)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.009 -0.022∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.102∗ 0.006 -0.168∗∗∗ 0.105 -0.113 0.154 -0.048 0.196
(0.053) (0.577) (0.035) (0.379) (0.071) (0.765) (0.072) (0.667)
Observations 22572 22572 47578 47578 12030 12030 12004 12004
DWHpval 0.799 0.453 0.692 0.714
S7: US S7: US S7: US S7: US
BMI25- BMI25+ Fat- Fat+
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018)
IV-bi-N 0.630 1.466∗∗∗ 1.641∗∗∗ -0.225
(0.399) (0.286) (0.544) (0.553)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.009 -0.022∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.025 -0.351 -0.028∗ -0.224 -0.016 -0.525 0.034 -0.849∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.249) (0.015) (0.164) (0.030) (0.331) (0.030) (0.293)
Observations 22572 22572 47578 47578 12030 12030 12004 12004
DWHpval 0.180 0.231 0.118 0.002
BWC: US BWC: US BWC: US BWC: US
BMI25- BMI25+ Fat- Fat+
1st stage
IV-bi-E 0.075∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018)
IV-bi-N 0.630 1.466∗∗∗ 1.641∗∗∗ -0.225
(0.399) (0.286) (0.544) (0.553)
IV-bi-N - Age -0.009 -0.022∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
2nd stage
Complete retire -0.001 0.068 -0.001 -0.006 0.007 0.057 0.010∗ -0.050
(0.004) (0.042) (0.003) (0.029) (0.005) (0.054) (0.005) (0.046)
Observations 22572 22572 47578 47578 12030 12030 12004 12004
DWHpval 0.098 0.824 0.321 0.163
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
6 Conclusion
In summary, the main findings of this paper are:
• Validation analysis on cross-sectional cross-country analysis: we show that the robust-
ness is weak if we use the estimation strategy based on the cross-sectional analysis. We
find that the estimated results are sensitive with respect to the heterogeneity of the set
of analyzed countries. The effect of a part of the analyzed countries influences the final
conclusion on the effect of retirement on cognitive function.
• Retirement analysis:
56
– Word recall summary score: in the U.S., there is a negative effect of retirement on
word recall summary scores in almost all groups. However, in other countries, the
effect is heterogeneous among different groups, and we cannot find that the effect
is negative in many groups.
– Serial 7’s: there is a negative effect of retirement on the score among almost all
groups in all countries.
– Heterogeneity: the elderly with higher BMI and higher fat intake show negative
effect of retirement on cognitive function.
Finally, we compare our results with the results of related literature in Table 21. Our results
are based on “retirement analysis” (full sample).
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In this paper, we show that social attendance may not be a proxy of cognitive investment
behaviors, and that elderly do not change their leisure activities before and after retirement.
As such, an important question is what kind of activity might be a cognitive investment
behavior. Additionally, we only analyze the group and the countries where we can use the
pensionable age as IV. Another instrumental variable would expand our analysis. Finally,
we find that BMI and fat intake are important determinants of the effect of retirement on
cognitive function heterogeneity. Consequently, this analysis should be expanded to more
countries.
A Appendix
A.1 Pension Eligibility Age
Rohwedder and Willis (2010) use the pensionable age, which is based on the source from
Pensions at a Glance (OECD) and Social Security Programs throughout the World: Europe,
2004. 23 We correct these pensionable ages and also add the pensionable age in 2010 for
our analysis. For establishing the correct pensionable age, we use the information from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics in each country, although not all are available. Subsequently, we
contact with the Bureau of Labor Statistics or Bureau of Statistics directly, and obtain the
information. If not, we use the OECD’s Pensions at a Glance, Social Security Programs
Throughout The World (Europe, Asia and the Pacific, and the Americas) and the EUs
Mutual Information System in Social Protection as data sources, although detailed pension
eligibility ages are still not available for many countries. Finally, the correct pension eligibility
ages are obtained for the U.S., England, Germany, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Japan, China, and Korea. We do not analyze the countries where the
detail information about the pension eligibility age cannot be available. We do not analyze
the countries where the pension eligibility age is not available. The following tables show the
eligibility ages for the countries analyzed.
23See the online Appendix by Rohwedder and Willis (2010) for details.
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Table 22: Pensionable Age in Section 4
2004 2010
R & W (2010) MNO(2015) MNO(2015)
Early Full Early Full Early Full
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
R & W original countries
US 62 62 65 65 62 62 65 65 62 62 66 66
UK 65 60 65 60 ∗1 ∗1 65 60 ∗1 ∗1 65 60
Austria 61 56 65 60 61+6m 56+6m 65 60 62 57+6m 65 60
Germany 60 60 65 65 60 60 65 65 63 60 65 65
Sweden 61 61 65 65 61 61 65 65 61 61 65 65
Netherlands 60 60 65 65 ∗1 ∗1 65 65 ∗1 ∗1 65 65
Spain 60 60 65 65 61 61 65 65 61 61 65 65
Italy 57 57 65 60 57 57 65 60 59 57 65 60
France 60 60 60 60 60 60 65 65 60 60 65 65
Denmark 60 60 65 65 60 60 65 65 60 60 65+6m 65+6m
Greece 60 55 62 57 55 55 65 60 60 60 65 65
Switzerland 63 62 65 63 63 61 65 63 63 62 65 64
Belgium 60 60 65 63 60 60 65 63 60 60 65 65
Other Western countries
Czechia 60 ∗1 62+2m ∗2
Poland 60 55 65 60
Ireland ∗1 ∗1 65 65
Hungary 60 60 62 62
Portugal 55 55 65 65
Slovenia 58 58 61 63
Estonia 60 58 63 61
Luxemberg 60 60 65 65
East Asian countries
Japan 60 60 64 62
China ∗3 ∗3 60 ∗3 55 ∗3
∗1: No early retirement.
∗2: Different among the number of children. 61(No child), 59y8m(1 child) 58+4m(2 children) , 57(3 or 4 children) , 55+8m(more than 5 children)
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Table 23: Pension eligibility age in Section 5
Table 24: PEA: US
Birth cohort PEA
Early PEA
62y0m
Normal PEA
˜ 1937.12 65y0m
1938.1 ˜ 1938.12 65y2m
1939.1 ˜ 1939.12 65y4m
1940.1 ˜ 1940.12 65y6m
1941.1 ˜ 1941.12 65y8m
1942.1 ˜ 1942.12 65y10m
1943.1 ˜ 1943.12 66y0m
1944.1 ˜ 1944.12 66y0m
1945.1 ˜ 1945.12 66y0m
1946.1 ˜ 1946.12 66y0m
1947.1 ˜ 1947.12 66y0m
1948.1 ˜ 1948.12 66y0m
1949.1 ˜ 1949.12 66y0m
1950.1 ˜ 1950.12 66y0m
1951.1 ˜ 1951.12 66y0m
1952.1 ˜ 1952.12 66y0m
1953.1 ˜ 1953.12 66y0m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.12 66y0m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.12 66y2m
1956.1 ˜ 1956.12 66y4m
1957.1 ˜ 1957.12 66y6m
1958.1 ˜ 1958.12 66y8m
1959.1 ˜ 1959.12 66y10m
1960.1 ˜ 1960.12 67y0m
Table 25: PEA: UK
Birth cohort PEA
Normal PEA: Male
˜ 1953.12 65y0m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.12 66y0m
1955.1 ˜ 1959.12 66y0m
1960.1 ˜ 1960.12 67y0m
1961.1 ˜ 67y0m
Normal PEA: Female
˜ 1949.12 60y0m
1950.1 ˜ 1950.12 61y0m
1951.1 ˜ 1951.12 62y0m
1952.1 ˜ 1952.12 63y0m
1953.1 ˜ 65y0m
Table 26: PEA: Germany
Birth cohort PEA
Early PEA: Male
˜ 1952.12 63y0m
1953.1 ˜ 1953.12 63y2m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.12 63y4m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.12 63y6m
1956.1 ˜ 1956.12 63y8m
1957.1 ˜ 1957.12 63y10m
1958.1 ˜ 1958.12 64y0m
1959.1 ˜ 1959.12 64y2m
1960.1 ˜ 1960.12 64y4m
1961.1 ˜ 1961.12 64y6m
1962.1 ˜ 1962.12 64y8m
1963.1 ˜ 1963.12 64y10m
1964.1 ˜ 1964.12 65y0m
Early PEA: Female
˜ 1951.12 60y0m
Normal PEA
˜ 1946.12 65y0m
1947.1 ˜ 1947.12 65y1m
1948.1 ˜ 1948.12 65y2m
1949.1 ˜ 1949.12 65y3m
1950.1 ˜ 1950.12 65y4m
1951.1 ˜ 1951.12 65y5m
1952.1 ˜ 1952.12 65y6m
1953.1 ˜ 1953.12 65y7m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.12 65y8m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.12 65y9m
1956.1 ˜ 1956.12 65y10m
1957.1 ˜ 1957.12 65y11m
1958.1 ˜ 1958.12 66y0m
1959.1 ˜ 1959.12 66y2m
1960.1 ˜ 1960.12 66y4m
1961.1 ˜ 1961.12 66y6m
1962.1 ˜ 1962.12 66y8m
1963.1 ˜ 1963.12 66y10m
1964.1 ˜ 1964.12 67y0m
Table 27: PEA: France
Birth cohort PEA
Early PEA
˜ 1951.6 60y0m
1951.7 ˜ 1951.12 60y4m
1952.1 ˜ 1952.12 60y9m
1953.1 ˜ 1953.12 61y2m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.12 61y7m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.12 62y0m
1956.1 ˜ . 62y0m
Normal PEA
˜ 1951.6 65y0m
1951.7 ˜ 1951.12 65y4m
1952.1 ˜ 1952.12 65y9m
1953.1 ˜ 1953.12 66y2m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.12 66y7m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.12 67y0m
1956.1 ˜ . 67y0m
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Table 28: Pension eligibility age in Section 5
Table 29: PEA: Denmark
Birth cohort PEA
Early PEA
˜ 1953.12 60y0m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.6 60y6m
1954.7 ˜ 1954.12 61y0m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.6 61y6m
1955.7 ˜ 1955.12 62y0m
1956.1 ˜ 1956.6 62y6m
1956.7 ˜ 1958.12 63y0m
1959.1 ˜ 1959.6 63y6m
1959.7 ˜ 1964.6 64y0m
1964.7 ˜ 64y0m
Normal PEA
˜ 1953.12 65y0m
1954.1 ˜ 1954.6 65y6m
1954.7 ˜ 1954.12 66y0m
1955.1 ˜ 1955.6 66y6m
1955.7 ˜ 1955.12 67y0m
1956.1 ˜ 1956.6 67y0m
1956.7 ˜ 1958.12 67y0m
1959.1 ˜ 1959.6 67y0m
1959.7 ˜ 1964.6 67y0m
1964.7 ˜ 67y0m
Table 30: PEA: Japan
Birth cohort PEA
Normal PEA: Male
˜1941.4.1 60y0m
1941.4.2˜1943.4.1 61y0m
1943.4.2˜1945.4.1 62y0m
1945.4.2˜1947.4.1 63y0m
1947.4.2˜1949.4.1 64y0m
1949.4.2˜1953.4.1 65y0m
1953.4.2˜1955.4.1 65y0m
1955.4.2˜1957.4.1 65y0m
1957.4.2˜1959.4.1 65y0m
1959.4.2˜1961.4.1 65y0m
1961.4.2˜ 65y0m
Normal PEA: Female
˜1932.4.1 55y0m
1932.4.2˜1934.4.1 56y0m
1934.4.2˜1936.4.1 57y0m
1936.4.2˜1937.4.1 58y0m
1937.4.2˜1938.4.1 58y0m
1938.4.2˜1940.4.1 59y0m
1940.4.2˜1946.4.1 60y0m
1946.4.2˜1948.4.1 61y0m
1948.4.2˜1950.4.1 62y0m
1950.4.2˜1952.4.1 63y0m
1952.4.2˜1954.4.1 64y0m
1954.4.2˜1958.4.1 65y0m
1958.4.2˜1960.4.1 65y0m
1960.4.2˜1962.4.1 65y0m
1962.4.2˜1964.4.1 65y0m
1964.4.2˜1965.4.1 65y0m
1965.4.2˜ 65y0m
Table 31: PEA: Korea
Birth cohort PEA
Early PEA
˜ 1952.12 55y0m
1953.1 ˜ 1956.12 56y0m
1957.1 ˜ 1960.12 57y0m
1961.1 ˜ 1964.12 58y0m
1965.1 ˜ 1968.12 59y0m
1969.1 ˜ . 60y0m
Normal PEA
˜ 1952.12 60y0m
1953.1 ˜ 1956.12 61y0m
1957.1 ˜ 1960.12 62y0m
1961.1 ˜ 1964.12 63y0m
1965.1 ˜ 1968.12 64y0m
1969.1 ˜ . 65y0m
A.2 Parameterization: Model of Retirement and Cognitive Func-
tion Decline
We explain the details of model (3) parameterization in this section. We have explained
the utility function, pension payments, and cognitive production functions in section 5. The
cost function of cognitive investment, the function of reduced time by cognitive investment,
and the function of income are parameterizes as follows:
• G(ifWt, ijWt, ijLt, ijLt) = βWf ifWt + βWjijWt + βLf ifLt + βLjijLt
• L(ifLt, ijLt) = αf ifLt + αjijLt
• y(aft, ajt, t, lt) = Y · (aη1ftaη2jt )(T − t)η3(1− lt)
A.3 Weight
The following procedure is used to calculate the estimation weights in section 4:
• We create the cells considering individual characteristics: age × gender × country of
residence. The total number of cells is (The Number of Age (5)(From 60 to 64)) ×
(The Number of Gender (2)(Male, Female)) × (The Number of Country of Residence).
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• In each cell, we calculate the population based on the source of UN data: A World
Information. 24 All respondents can be assigned to a cell number depending on his/her
characteristics.
• Finally, we make the following estimation weight. The following is the weight value of
a respondent i. Let i be assigned to the characteristic number k. Then, the following
value is assigned to respondent i for the estimation weight. B is the number of the
set of the characteristics. Tk is the number of respondents in the (merged) dataset (for
cross-country analysis) assigned to characteristics number k.
Wik =
1
Tk
Pr(Cell Number = k)∑
l∈B Pr(Cell Number = l)
(8)
Acknowledgement
The HRS (Health and Retirement Study) is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging
(grant number NIA U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan.
The ELSA (English Longitudinal Study of Ageing) is funded by the US National Institute
on Ageing and a consortium of UK government departments coordinated by the Office for
National Statistics.
This paper uses data from SHARE Waves 1, 2, 3 (SHARELIFE), 4 and 5 (DOIs: 10.6103
/SHARE.w1.260, 10.6103/SHARE.w2.260, 10.6103/SHARE.w3.100, 10.6103/SHARE.w4.111,
10.6103/SHARE.w5.100), see Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2013) for methodological details. The
SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through FP5
(QLK6-CT-2001-00360), FP6 (SHARE-I3: RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE: CIT5-CT-2005
-028857, SHARELIFE: CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and FP7 (SHARE-PREP: N211909, SHARE-
LEAP: N227822, SHARE M4: N261982). Additional funding from the German Ministry of
Education and Research, the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG00
5842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, R21 AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG BSR06-11, OGHA
04-064$) and from various national funding sources is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-
project.org).
The Japanese Study of Aging and Retirement (JSTAR) was conducted by the Research
Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), Hitotsubashi University, and the Univer-
sity of Tokyo.
References
Adam, S., Bay, C., Bonsang, E., Germain, S., and Perelman, S. (2006). Occupational ac-
tivities and cognitive reserve: a frontier approach applied to the Survey on Health,
Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). CREPP Working Paper 2006/05.
24Please refer to the website at: http://data.un.org/Default.aspx.
63
Altonji, J. G., Blom, E., and Meghir, C. (2012). Heterogeneity in Human Capital Investments
: High School Curriculum , College Major, and Careers. The Annual Review of
Economics, (4):185–223.
Behncke, S. (2012). Does Retirement Trigger Ill Health? Health economics, 21:282–300.
Ben-Porath, Y. (1967). The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings.
The Journal of Political Economy, 75(4):352–365.
Bingley, P. and Martinello, A. (2013). Mental retirement and schooling. European Economic
Review, 63:292–298.
Bonsang, E., Adam, S., and Perelman, S. (2012). Does retirement affect cognitive function-
ing? Journal of Health Economics, 31(3):490–501.
Bound, J. and Waidmann, T. (2007). Estimating the Health Effects of Retirement. University
of Michigan Retirement Research Center Working Papers.
Charles, K. K. (2004). Is Retirement Depressing?: Labor Force Inactivity and Psychological
Well being in Later Life. Research in Labor Economics, 23:269–299.
Coe, N. B., Gaudecker, H.-M. V., Lindeboom, M., and Maurer, J. (2012). The Effect Of
Retirement On Cognitive Functioning. Health Economics, 21:913–927.
Coe, N. B. and Lindeboom, M. (2008). Does Retirement Kill You? Evidence from Early
Retirement Windows. IZA Discussion Papers, 93.
Coe, N. B. and Zamarro, G. (2011). Retirement effects on health in Europe. Journal of
Health Economics, 30(1):77–86.
Dave, D., Rashad, I., and Spasojevic, J. (2008). The Effects of Retirement on Physical and
Mental Health Outcomes. Southern Economic Journal, 75(2):497–523.
Devore, E. E., Stampfer, M. J., Breteler, M. M. B., Rosner, B., Kang, J. H., Okereke, O., Hu,
F. B., and Grodstein, F. (2009). Dietary fat intake and cognitive decline in women
with type 2 diabetes. Diabetes Care, 32(4):635–640.
Dik, M. G., Deeg, D. J., Visser, M., and Jonker, C. (2003). Early Life Physical Activity
and Cognition at Old Age. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology,
25(5):643–653.
Eskelinen, M. H., Ngandu, T., Helkala, E. L., Tuomilehto, J., Nissinen, A., Soininen, H.,
and Kivipelto, M. (2008). Fat intake at midlife and cognitive impairment later in life:
A population-based CAIDE study. International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry,
23(7):741–747.
Grossman, M. (1972). On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health. Journal
of Political Economy, 80(2):223–255.
Gruber, J. and Wise, D. A. (1998). Social Security and Retirement: An International Com-
parison. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and
Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 88(2):158–163.
Hashimoto, H. (2013). Health Consequences of Transitioning to Retirement and Social Par-
ticipation: Results based on JSTAR panel data. RIETI Discussion Paper Series
13-E-078.
64
Hashimoto, H. (2015). Impacts of Leaving Paid Work on Health, Functions, and Lifestyle Be-
havior: Evidence from JSTAR panel data. RIETI Discussion Paper Series 15-E-114.
Hernaes, E., Markussen, S., Piggott, J., and Vestad, O. L. (2013). Does retirement age
impact mortality? Journal of Health Economics, 32(3):586–598.
Insler, M. (2014). The Health Consequences of Retirement. Journal of Human Resources,
49(1):195–233.
Johnston, D. W. and Lee, W.-S. (2009). Retiring to the good life? The short-term effects of
retirement on health. Economics Letters, 103(1):8–11.
Kajitani, S. (2011). Working in old age and health outcomes in Japan. Japan and The World
Economy, 23:153–162.
Kajitani, S., Sakata, K., and McKenzie, C. (2013). Does the Definition of Retirement Matter
in Estimating the Effects of Retirement on Cognitive Functioning? 20th International
Congress on Modelling and Simulation, Adelaide, Australia, 1-6 December 2013, pages
153–162.
Kajitani, S., Sakata, K., and McKenzie, C. (2014). Occupation, Retirement and Cogni-
tive Functioning. Discussion Paper Series Graduate School and School of Economics
Meisei University, Discussion Paper Series, No.27.
Kajitani, S., Sakata, K., and McKenzie, C. (2016a). Occupation, retirement and cognitive
functioning. Ageing and Society, May 2016:1–29.
Kajitani, S., Sakata, K., and McKenzie, C. (2016b). Use It Too Much and Lose It? The
Effect of Working Hours on Cognitive Ability. Melbourne Institute Working Paper,
No. 7/16.
Kerkhofs, M. and Lindeboom, M. (1997). Age related health dynamics and changes in labour
market status. Health economics, 6(4):407–423.
Latif, E. (2011). The impact of retirement on psychological well-being in Canada. Journal
of Socio-Economics, 40(4):373–380.
Lindeboom, M., Portrait, F., and Van Den Berg, G. J. (2002). An econometric analysis
of the mental-health effects of major events in the life of older individuals. Health
Economics, 11(6):505–520.
Mazzonna, F. and Peracchi, F. (2012). Ageing, cognitive abilities and retirement. European
Economic Review, 56(4):691–710.
McEwen, B. S. and Sapolsky, R. M. (1995). Stress and Cognitive Function. Current Opinion
in Neurobiology, 5:205–216.
Neuman, K. (2008). Quit your job and get healthier? The effect of retirement on health.
Journal of Labor Research, 29(2):177–201.
Nishimura, Y. and Oikawa, M. (2017). Effect of Retirement Duration on Cognitive Ability
in the US. Mimeo.
Nyberg, L., Habib, R., and Herlitz, A. (2000). Brain activation during episodic memory
retrieval: Sex differences. Acta Psychologica, 105:181–194.
Nyberg, L., Lovden, M., Riklund, K., Lindenberger, U., and Backman, L. (2012). Memory
65
aging and brain maintenance. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(5):292–305.
Potter, G. G., Helms, M. J., and Plassman, B. L. (2008). Associations of job demands
and intelligence with cognitive performance among men in late life. Neurology,
70(19):1803–1808.
Raji, C., Merrill, D., Eyre, H., Mallam, S., Torosyan, N., Erickson, K., Lopez, O., Becker,
J., Carmichael, O., Gach, H., Thompson, P., Longstreth, W., and Kuller, L. (2016).
Longitudinal Relationships between Caloric Expenditure and Gray Matter in the Car-
diovascular Health Study. Journal of Aalzheimers Disease, 52:719–729.
Rendall, A., Rendall, M., Rendall, A., and Rendall, M. (2014). Math Matters : Education
Choices and Wage Inequality Math Matters : Education Choices and Wage Inequality.
University of Zurich Department of Economics Working Paper Series, (May).
Rohwedder, S. and Willis, R. J. (2010). Mental Retirement. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 24(1):119–138.
Rose, H. and Betts, J. R. (2004). The effect of high school courses on earnings. The Review
of Economics and Statistics, 86(May):497–513.
Satizabal, C. L., Beiser, A. S., Chouraki, V., Chene, G., Dufouil, C., and Seshadri, S. (2016).
Incidence of Dementia over Three Decades in the Framingham Heart Study. The New
England Journal of Medicine, 374:523–532.
Scarmeas, N. and Stern, Y. (2003). Cognitive Reserve and Lifestyle. Journal of Clinical and
Experimental Neuropsychology, 25(5):483–506.
Schooler, C., Mulatu, M. S., and Oates, G. (1999). The continuing effects of substantively
complex work on the intellectual functioning of older workers. Psychology and Aging,
14(3):483–506.
Sindi, S., Hagman, G., H˚akansson, K., Kulmala, J., Nilsen, C., K˚areholt, I., Soininen, H.,
Solomon, A., and Kivipelto, M. (2016). Midlife Work-Related Stress Increases De-
mentia Risk in Later Life: The CAIDE 30-Year Study. The Journals of Gerontology
Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 00(00):gbw043.
Verghese, J., Lipton, R. B., Katz, M. J., Hall, C. B., Derby, C. A., Kuslansky, G., Ambrose,
A. F. M., Sliwinski, M., and Buschke, H. (2003). Leisure Activities and the Risk of
Dementia in the Elderly. The New England Journal of Medicine, 348(5):2508–2516.
Wilson, R. S., Barnes, L. L., and Bennett, D. A. (2003). Assessment of Lifetime Partici-
pation in Cognitively Stimulating Activities. Journal of Clinical and Experimental
Neuropsychology, 25(5):634–642.
66
